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THE DEATH PENALTY AS INCAPACITATION
Marah Stith McLeod*
Courts and commentators give scant attention to the
incapacitation rationale for capital punishment, focusing
instead on retribution and deterrence. The idea that execution
may be justified to prevent further violence by dangerous
prisoners is often ignored in death penalty commentary. The
view on the ground could not be more different. Hundreds of
executions have been premised on the need to protect society
from dangerous offenders. Two states require a finding offuture
dangerousness for any death sentence, and over a dozen others
treat it as an aggravating factor that turns murder into a capital
crime.
How can courts and commentators pay so little heed to this
driving force behind executions? The answer lies in two
assumptions: first, that solitary confinement and life without
parole also incapacitate, and second, that prediction error
makes executions based on future risk inherently arbitrary. Yet
solitary confinement and life without parole entail new harms-
either torturous isolation or inadequate restraint. Meanwhile,
the problem ofprediction error, while significant, can be greatly
reduced by reevaluating future dangerousness over time.
This Article illuminates the remarkable history, influence, and
normative import of the incapacitation rationale, and shows
how serious engagement with the incapacitation rationale can
lead to practical reforms that would make the death penalty
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more fair. It concludes by highlighting several of the most
promising reforms.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has identified retribution and deterrence as
"the two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty."' It has
routinely omitted incapacitation from this list. The Court has barred
the death penalty when it has found the penalty to exceed the goals of
retribution and deterrence, without considering the aim of
incapacitation.2 State courts likewise have focused on retribution and
1 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441, modified on denial of reh'g, 554 U.S. 945
(2008); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (same); Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) ("Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) ... identified
'retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders' as the social purposes
served by the death penalty. Unless the imposition of the death penalty. . . 'measurably
contributes to one or both of these goals, it "is nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering," and hence an unconstitutional
punishment."' (citation omitted)).
2 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 571-72 (concluding "that neither retribution nor deterrence
provides adequate justification for imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders," while
failing to mention the incapacitation rationale); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (invalidating the
death penalty for intellectually disabled offenders as insufficiently supported by the aims of
retribution or deterrence, while ignoring incapacitation); id. at 350 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("The Court conveniently ignores a third 'social purpose' of the death penalty-
'incapacitation of dangerous criminals . . ..' (citation omitted)).
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deterrence; the Connecticut Supreme Court recently proclaimed that
"[i]t is generally accepted that, if capital punishment is to be morally
and legally justified, it must be based on the deterrent or retributive
value of executions."3 Scholars, too, tend to take seriously only the
retribution and deterrence theories for capital punishment. Even
prominent criminal law casebooks, designed to offer foundational
knowledge of the law and written by experts in the field, often
identify only "two justifications for the death penalty-retribution
and deterrence of capital crimes",4-and omit any discussion of the
incapacitation rationale.
The absence of sustained discourse regarding the incapacitation
rationale6 contrasts markedly with its influence on the actual practice
of capital punishment. The risk of future violence is often a
dispositive reason for a death sentence. Two states require a finding
of future dangerousness before a death sentence may be imposed,
and more than a dozen other states and the federal government permit
a death sentence to be predicated on future dangerousness.8 Hundreds
of capital offenders, and perhaps thousands, have been executed over
the last several decades on this ground. Texas, which has employed
capital punishment more often than any other state, has executed
more than 550 capital offenders based on jury predictions that they
State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 56 (Conn. 2015) (citing Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441, and
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
4 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 233 (6th ed. 2017).
5 See, e.g., Joshua Dressler & Stephen P. Garvey, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law
348-52 (6th ed. 2016) (outlining policy debates regarding the deterrence and retribution
aims of the death penalty and omitting any reference to incapacitation); Sanford H. Kadish,
Stephen J. Schulhofer & Rachel E. Barkow, Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and
Materials 555-65 (10th ed. 2017) (discussing only the deterrence and retribution arguments
for the death penalty); LaFave, supra note 4 at 224-33 (discussing Eighth Amendment
limitations on the death penalty in light of retribution and deterrence, without mentioning
incapacitation).
6 William W. Berry III, Ending Death by Dangerousness: A Path to the De Facto
Abolition of the Death Penalty, 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 889, 918 (2010) ("[T]he Court has never
explicitly addressed the acceptability of future dangerousness as a consideration in the
determination of whether to sentence an offender to death."); Mitzi Dorland & Daniel
Krauss, The Danger of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing: Exacerbating the Problem of
Arbitrary and Capricious Decision-Making, 29 Law & Psychol. Rev. 63, 69 (2005)
("Strangely, the rationale for future dangerousness as a useful factor in death penalty
decision-making has never been adequately addressed by the courts . . . .").
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 163.150(1)(b) & (f) (West 2015); Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann.
art. 37.071 (West 2006).
See infra notes 71-73 & 79-80.
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would commit future violence if allowed to live.9 In 2017 alone, all
seven of the executions in Texas turned upon findings of future
dangerousness.o It is hard to exaggerate the impact of the
incapacitation rationale in America today."
Why have scholars paid so little attention to this influential
rationale for the death penalty? This Article contends that scholars
(and quite a few judges) have dismissed the incapacitation rationale
as invalid based on two mistaken assumptions.12 First, many believe
that the availability of solitary confinement and life without parole
renders execution an unnecessary and excessive response to the risk
of future violence.13 To these critics, incapacitation is irrelevant to the
death penalt% debate, because it is equally served by these non-lethal
alternatives. Second, many also believe that the risk of prediction
error1 5 makes future dangerousness an arbitrary and therefore unjust
9 See Searchable Execution Database, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., https://deathpenaltyinfo.
org/views-executions [https://perma.cc/QTP3-ZK7B] (last visited May 28, 2018) (showing
database results of more than 550 executions in Texas since 1977).
1o Execution List 2017, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-
list-2017 [https://perma.cc/EGH8-M9LC] (last visited May 28, 2018).
Predictions of dangerousness have had such influence on death sentencing that one
abolitionist scholar, William Berry, has argued that we could achieve de facto abolition of
capital punishment by barring such predictions as a basis for death. See Berry, supra note 6,
at 893.
12 Some law and economics scholars posit that the benefit from incapacitation at least in
theory may justify some executions. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, A Model of Optimal
Incapacitation, 77 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 107, 109 (1987).
13 See, e.g., Berry, supra note 6, at 889 (arguing that the "concept of future
dangerousness" is "largely irrelevant in light of the availability of life without parole (and
solitary confinement)"); Carla Edmondson, Nothing Is Certain but Death: Why Future
Dangerousness Mandates Abolition of the Death Penalty, 20 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 857,
916 (2016) (arguing that "the availability of a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole" renders incapacitation an invalid reason for execution); see also Glossip v. Gross,
135 S. Ct. 2726, 2767 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (dismissing the incapacitation rationale
because "the major alternative to capital punishment-namely, life in prison without
possibility of parole-also incapacitates"); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 517 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that "incapacitation is largely irrelevant, at least when
the alternative of life imprisonment without possibility of parole is available"); State v.
Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 56 (Conn. 2015) (asserting that "execution, as compared to life in
prison .. . offers minimal additional value by way of incapacitation").
14 See, e.g., Berry, supra note 6, at 904 ("Life without parole appears to provide the very
alternative to death that eliminates dangerousness as a valid reason for execution.").
15 Some may argue that prediction "error" or "inaccuracy" is an improper term, because
predictions are matters of probabilities. This Article uses the term "prediction error" mostly
for linguistic convenience, to refer to the fact that probabilities of violence can change over
time. An offender once deemed likely to commit criminal acts of violence may no longer be
1126
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criterion for execution.1 6 Convinced that these problems are real and
insurmountable, such critics give the incapacitation rationale little
further thought. Indeed, even scholars who have recognized the
practical influence of future dangerousness in capital sentencing have
treated its underlying theory as indefensible, given the existence of
non-lethal alternatives and prediction error.17
This Article contends that neither objection is a sufficient reason to
ignore or dismiss the incapacitation rationale. A closer analysis of the
proposed non-lethal alternatives reveals that solitary confinement
entails extraordinary cruelty and psychological damage,'8 while life
imprisonment without parole, though it may reduce the risk to society
at large, concentrates the risk of future violence on fellow prisoners
and unarmed prison guards.19 These alternatives, therefore, do not
represent the straightforward choice scholars have suggested, but
rather an agonizing one: either torturous restraint, or dangerous
inadequacy. While one might conclude that the non-lethal
alternatives are still better than execution, a reasoned decision
requires careful and informed deliberation regarding the relative
importance of future safety, humane treatment, human dignity, and
human life--considerations that many commentators entirely ignore.
The incapacitation rationale cannot be cast aside because of the
second objection-that of prediction error-either. Though
prediction error is a real and grave problem for just pursuit of the
incapacitation rationale, it is a problem that can be significantly
likely to do so at an older age. A prediction of future violence at original sentencing, based
on prior criminal history, may be quite different from one years later, based on post-
sentencing prison behavior. While these are not situations of demonstrable empirical error in
sentencing, this Article views them as examples of prediction error-i.e., situations in which
executions are justified by probabilities that no longer hold true.
16 See, e.g., Dorland & Krauss, supra note 6, at 102-04 (arguing that states should remove
the explicit consideration of future dangerousness from death sentencing because of
prediction inaccuracy); Tex. Defender Serv., Deadly Speculation: Misleading Texas Capital
Juries with False Predictions of Future Dangerousness 47 (2004), http://texasdefender.org
/wp-content/uploads/TDSDeadly-Speculation.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6N4-UHPQ] ("[I]t is
impossible to predict the future with the accuracy and consistency required of evidence that
determines whether someone lives or dies.").
1 See, e.g., Berry, supra note 6, at 893; Meghan Shapiro, An Overdose of Dangerousness:
How 'Future Dangerousness' Catches the Least Culpable Capital Defendants and
Undermines the Rationale for the Executions It Supports, 35 Am. J. Crim. L. 145, 186-88
(2008); Dorland & Krauss, supra note 6, at 66-67; Edmondson, supra note 13, at 861.
i8 See infra Part II.A.1.
19 See infra Part II.A.2.
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reduced by reevaluating future dangerousness over time. Such review
could be conducted every five years, for example, and would
consider all the evidence, including probative information regarding a
prisoner's behavior while incarcerated. A state commission or parole
board could conduct such review. If a prisoner sentenced to death
because of future dangerousness were found no longer to pose a
threat, his death sentence would be reduced to life.2  This reform
would accord with an existing trend toward reevaluation of long-term
sentences and renewed focus on risk and rehabilitation. By
reconsidering future dangerousness in this way, capital punishment
jurisdictions can transform the bane of execution delay2 2 into a source
of greater fairness and consistency in capital sentencing.
Another reform critical to fairness in the current practice of capital
punishment, and likely to be overlooked by those who ignore the
incapacitation rationale, lies in procedural separation of the issues of
desert and of future dangerousness. Today, all jurisdictions that
consider future dangerousness in capital sentencing require or permit
23juries to consider future dangerousness at the same time as desert,
20 This proposal does not require periodic reconsideration of a purely moral determination
by the jury that the death penalty is deserved. Such reconsideration of desert could
undermine respect for the jury as "the conscience of the community," Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968), could present practical problems if a new desert
determination required a new jury (as Supreme Court cases suggest it would, see infra note
232 and accompanying text), and would undermine finality of sentences without evidence
that the original decision was demonstrably wrong. Any arguments for nonetheless adopting
such reconsideration of desert are beyond the scope of this Article.
21 See, e.g., The Am. Law Inst., Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Proposed Final Draft
§ 305.6 (approved May 2017), http://robinainstitute.umn.edu/publications/model-penal-code
-sentencing-proposed-final-draft-approved-may-2017 [https://perma.cc/RW98-A95E] (sugg-
esting principles for judicial reevaluation and reduction of long-term sentences once
prisoners have served at least fifteen years); John Monahan, Risk Assessment in Sentencing,
in Academy for Justice, a Report on Scholarship and Criminal Justice Reform 2 (Erik Luna
ed., 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3024016 [https://perma.cc/D54Z-EQ7S] (citing trend
toward focus on risk assessments in sentencing).
22 Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1115 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) ("[A] punishment of death after significant delay is 'so totally without
penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering."' (citation
omitted)); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) ("[Tlhe longer the delay, the weaker the justification for imposing the death
penalty in terms of punishment's basic retributive or deterrent purposes.").
23 All states that require or permit the finder of fact to consider future dangerousness as an
aggravating factor (or non-dangerousness as a mitigating factor) when deciding whether to
impose the death penalty in light of the aggravating and mitigating factors necessarily merge
the future dangerousness inquiry with the question of whether the death penalty is deserved.
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creating a grave risk that the jury may choose death to avoid future
danger regardless of desert. This problem can be avoided by
considering future dangerousness only after the jury, as "the
conscience of the community," has made a finding of desert.24
The effect of a finding of future dangerousness then would depend
on state priorities and moral choices. Some states might choose to
limit imposition of the death penalty to those offenders who both
deserve the death penalty and present a future danger (an approach
currently taken by Texas and Oregon, though without adequate
procedural separation between the desert and dangerousness
inquiries).25 A death penalty thus limited would be more rarely and
consistently applied, because it would require both a moral decision
that death is deserved as well as a reviewable empirical finding of
future dangerousness.26 Other states might choose to permit the death
penalty for those offenders who either present a future danger or
have committed particularly depraved offenses (an approach
See, e.g., Idaho Code § 19-2515(7) (2017) (requiring the court to instruct the jury to consider
any aggravating and mitigating circumstances and to tell the jury that "[i]f the jury does not
find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance or if the jury cannot unanimously
agree on the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance, the defendant will be
sentenced by the court to a term of life imprisonment with a fixed term of not less than ten
(10) years.") Texas and Oregon require the future dangerousness question to be answered
separately, but then require the jury to decide whether mitigating factors nonetheless make
the penalty inappropriate, requiring the jury to weigh future dangerousness and desert at the
same time. See Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 163.150(l)(b) (West 2015); Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 37.071 § 2 (West 2006). Virginia law does not specify when future dangerousness
must be considered; it only requires either future dangerousness or special vileness of the
crime be found by the jury before any death sentence may be imposed. Va. Code Ann.
§ 19.2-264.4(C) (2008). This leaves Virginia prosecutors free to argue future dangerousness
at any time in the penalty proceeding, and they have good reason to emphasize it before the
jury makes its ultimate recommendation.
24 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519.
25 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).
26 Some have argued that a death penalty that is rarely imposed is arbitrary. See, e.g.,
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring); Justin Marceau, Sam
Kamin & Wanda Foglia, Death Eligibility in Colorado: Many Are Called, Few Are Chosen,
84 Colo. L. Rev. 1069, 1114 (2013). That is true if a random handful of death-eligible
persons are actually executed. It would not be true if only a small number of capital
murderers were found to meet the dual requirements of desert and dangerousness. This
Article does not attempt to quantify the precise number of capital offenders who would
satisfy both conditions, because that enumeration would depend on personal normative
judgments about desert and what risk society is willing to tolerate.
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currently taken by Virginia, though also without proper procedural
separation between the desert and dangerousness inquiries 27).
No single approach to the relevance of future dangerousness is
obviously right, because the proper choice depends on each
jurisdiction's views about tolerable risk, the importance of desert, and
the utility and morality of the death penalty. States reasonably may
take different approaches according to the varied concerns of their
constituencies and cultures. No capital punishment jurisdiction
should adopt any approach, however, without first debating its harms
and benefits, and none should permit its chosen substantive approach
to be implemented without fair procedures.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I recounts how future
dangerousness became a dispositive factor in executions as an
indirect result of the Supreme Court's demand for fairness and
consistency in death sentencing, and how the Court condoned the role
of future dangerousness in capital sentencing without careful analysis
of the incapacitation rationale. Part II explains why the incapacitation
rationale has been dismissed as invalid by scholars and some Justices
on the Court; it addresses first the possibility of non-lethal
alternatives, and then the problem of prediction error. Part III
proposes reevaluation of dangerousness over time as a means to
correct prediction error. It further argues for a clear separation of
desert and future dangerousness, and offers several reforms that
would make the consideration of future dangerousness in capital
sentencing more fair and defensible.
This Article does not take a position on the death penalty itself, but
acknowledges it as a present reality that, however lamentable, is
unlikely to be abolished anytime soon. Thirty-one states, the federal
government, and the military28 authorize capital punishment, and two
states recently reaffirmed their commitment to it. 2 9 The Supreme
27 See infra notes 272-273 and accompanying text.
28 Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Facts About the Death Penalty (2018),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SRL-TN6T].
Referenda in Nebraska and California recently confirmed strong public support for the
death penalty. Nebraska Referendum 426-Nebraska Death Penalty Repeal Veto-Results:
Rejected, N.Y. Times (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/results/nebraska-
ballot-measure-426-repeal-lb-268 (recounting that voters overrode a repeal bill by a margin
of a 61.2% to 38.8%). See, e.g., Mark Berman, Executions and Death Sentences Plummeted
This Year as Capital Punishment Declined Nationwide, Wash. Post (Dec. 24, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/12/24/executions-and-death-
1130 [Vol. 104:1123
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Court likewise has sustained the death penalty's constitutionality and
recently made it harder to challenge lethal injection protocol.
3 The
Article addresses this reality, and seeks to engender reasoned debate
and essential reforms without needlessly alienating abolitionists or
advocates of capital punishment, whose joint effort will be critical to
such reforms.
I. DEATH AS INCAPACITATION
Future dangerousness became an explicit part of death penalty law
in the United States as an unintended consequence of the Supreme
Court's concerns with arbitrariness and inconsistency in capital
sentencing. In Furman v. Georgia3 1 in 1972, the Court invalidated the
32
death penalty in all but one state. The basic objection of the five
Justices who joined in the result was that the death penalty was not
being imposed in an even-handed manner.3 3 The narrow common
ground in the judgment left open the possibility that states could re-
enact capital punishment, if they were able to "reform their method of
sentences-both-plummeted-this-year-as-capital-punishment-dwindles-
nationwide/?utm term-.f7a913681203 ("[E]ven as capital punishment has declined in both
sentencing and practice, there were also signs this year of its persistence from lawmakers,
judges and the public, reminders that the death penalty is far from fading away.").
30See, e.g., Maurice Chammah & Tom Meagher, A Long Decline in Executions Takes a
Detour, The Marshall Project (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017
/10/18/a-long-decline-in-executions-takes-a-detour [https://perma.cc/F2NJ-DV4L] (noting
that "this year will be the first since 2009 in which there were more executions than the year
before," largely due to the Court's decision in Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726; 2731
(2015) (refusing to invalidate a lethal injection protocol where the death-sentenced prisoner
failed to show that it involved "a substantial risk of severe pain")).
3 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
32 Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 Geo. L.J. 113, 125 n.69
(2012) ("Forty states had death-penalty statutes in 1972, but Rhode Island's statute was
spared because it was (ironically) an obsolete 'mandatory' death-penalty provision and thus
not subject to the Court's ruling. It was struck down four years later by Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)." (citation omitted)).
33 The Justices in the Furman majority wrote five separate concurring opinions. Justices
Brennan and Marshall concluded that the death penalty was categorically unconstitutional.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 360 (Marshall, J., concurring). In
contrast, Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White left open the possibility of a constitutionally
valid death penalty scheme. See id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 309-10
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
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deciding who dies"34 in a way that prevented arbitrary or
discriminatory sentencing.
Ironically, Furman's attack on the death penalty interrupted a
slow, majoritarian move toward abolition. Just before the Court's
decision in 1972, forty states and the federal government permitted
the death penalty. At the same time, however, abolitionist arguments
had gained favor, death sentencing had gone down, and there had
been a de acto execution moratorium since 1967 due to capital case
litigation. Furman "set back the very cause it was intended to
promote"36 because it prompted state legislatures to reenact the death
penalty with protections against arbitrariness that bore a fresh stamp
of democratic legitimacy.
In the aftermath of Furman, states turned to future dangerousness
as part of their attempt to craft statutes that authorized death
sentences only on constitutional grounds and by constitutional
procedures. As an indirect result of that crucial decision by the
Supreme Court, the incapacitation rationale-discarded by most
academics as irrelevant and unjust-became a primary driver of the
death penalty as it exists today.
A. Future Dangerousness a  a Reason for Execution
After Furman, pro-capital punishment legislators scrambled to
draft death penalty legislation that would pass constitutional muster.
Thirty-five state legislatures passed new capital punishment statutes
within four years of Furman.37 They addressed the arbitrariness
problem in different ways. Some imposed mandatory capital
punishment, overcoming the problem of inconsistent choices through
a single, uniform choice. The Court later invalidated this mandatory
approach in Woodson v. North Carolina,38 which required juries to be
allowed to consider "the possibility of compassionate or mitigating
factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind."3 9
34 James S. Liebman & Lawrence C. Marshall, Less Is Better: Justice Stevens and the
Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1607, 1608 (2006).
3S Lain, supra note 32, at 127 ("[Tuhe feel of the death penalty in 1972, the zeitgeist of that
historical moment, was that the abolition of capital punishment was just a matter of time.").
36 Id. at 132.
3 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976) (plurality opinion).
38 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion).
39 Id. at 304.
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Other states sought to reduce the potential for arbitrariness and
discrimination by giving juries more guidance about what factors to
consider. Many enacted laws that authorized the jury to choose a
death sentence only if it found at least one statutory aggravating
factor and determined that the weight of the aggravating factor was
not counter-balanced by any mitigating factors. The new statutes
often provided for automatic appellate review of death sentences for
non-arbitrariness and consistency across cases.40
Future dangerousness became an explicit and legally required part
of capital cases in this post-Furman context. Texas was the first state
to require consideration of future dangerousness in every capital
sentencing. In reforming its death penalty statute, Texas narrowed the
range of crimes that could be punished with death.41 Unlike the states
that limited the death penalty at the time of jury sentencing-by
requiring at least one aggravating factor to elevate a first-degree
murder into a capital offense-Texas limited the death penalty ex
ante, by authorizin capital punishment for a narrower range of
intentional murders. If a defendant were convicted of one of those
specified types of murder, the jury would then be asked three "special
questions" in order to determine whether death was appropriate. One
question was "whether there [was] a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society."43 If the jury found beyond a reasonable
doubt that the answer to each question was yes, a death sentence
would be mandatory.44 Because the other two questions were
40 Liebman & Marshall, supra note 34, at 1621.
41 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1122 (limiting capital homicides to intentional and knowing
murders committed in five circumstances: murder of a peace officer or fireman; murder in
the course of kidnaping, burglary, robbery, forcible rape, or arson; murder for remuneration;
murder while escaping or attempting to escape from a penal institution; and murder of a
prison employee by a prison inmate).
42 The Supreme Court has allowed states to narrow the death penalty in two ways: "The
legislature may itself narrow the definition of capital offenses, as Texas ... [has]
done, . . . or the legislature may more broadly define capital offenses and provide for
narrowing by jury findings of aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase." Lowenfield
v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988).
43 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 269 (1976) (citing Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann.
art. 37.071(b) (Supp. 1975-1976)); see also 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1125 (amending Tex.
Code Crim. Pro. Ann. by adding art. 37.071).
4 Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269.
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essentially superfluous in light of a guilty verdict,4 5  the
dangerousness question became dispositive for a death sentence.46
Texas thus explicitly incorporated predictions of dangerousness into
capital sentencing, and, as described below, other states soon
followed suit.4 7
B. Judicial Approval
In Jurek v. Texas in 1976, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Texas's new capital punishment statute.4 8 In a
plurality opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court focused on
whether the jury had either too much discretion (condemned in
Furman and Gregg v. Georgia4 9) or too little discretion (condemned
in Woodson 5 0) 1 It determined that Texas had adequately narrowed
the jury's power to impose a death sentence by reducing the types of
murders for which death could be imposed, while allowing the
defendant to offer mitigating evidence for the jury to consider.52
Justice Stevens's plurality opinion considered the future
dangerousness question in Texas's death penalty statute in order to
resolve two issues. The first was whether the dangerousness inquiry
offered a procedural opportunity for the defendant to offer mitigating
evidence, and the Court concluded that it did.53 The second was
whether the future dangerousness inquiry was unconstitutionally
45 The other questions were "(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the
death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
the death of the deceased or another would result" and "(3) if raised by the evidence,
whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to
the provocation, if any, by the deceased." Id.
4 The Supreme Court has made clear that the aggravating factors under Texas capital
punishment law are built into the statutory definition of capital crimes, and thus are
determined in the guilt phase, whereas future dangerousness is a special question considered
in the penalty phase. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875-76 n.13 (1983).
47 See infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
48 428 U.S. at 276.
49 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("Furman mandates that where discretion
is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human
life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.").
so 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976).
51 Jurek, 428 U.S. at 271, 276.
52 Id. at 276.
53 See id. at 272, 276. See also Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304-05 (prohibiting a mandatory
death penalty that did not allow the jury to consider mitigating factors).
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vague and error-prone.54 Here, the Court held that although it was
"not easy to predict future behavior," the future dangerousness
question was not excessively vague or impossible for a jury to answer
correctly. 5 5 The Court emphasized that dangerousness predictions are
''an essential element" in all sorts of criminal justice decisions,
including bail, non-capital sentencing, and parole, and that Texas
juries had to perform a role "no different from the task performed
countless times each day throughout the American system of criminal
justice."56 "What is essential," the Court explained, "is that the jury
have before it all possible relevant information about the individual
defendant whose fate it must determine."57 Notably, as Justice
Marshall later observed, the Jurek Court only addressed the validity
of "the procedures prescribed by the Texas scheme, but did not
decide the substantive question of whether a prediction of future
dangerousness is a proper criterion for determining whether a
defendant is to live or die."58
In Barefoot v. Estelle eight years later, the Court cited Jurek to
assert that "the likelihood of a defendant committing further crimes is
a constitutionally acceptable criterion for imposing the death
penalty."59 It rebuffed challenges to the admissibility of expert
testimony on future dangerousness, explaining that a contrary
approach would "immediately call into question those other contexts
in which predictions of future behavior are constantly made."60 The
Court thus relied on Jurek for the idea that execution was a
constitutionally appropriate response to the risk of future violence,
even though the Jurek Court had not addressed that question.61
5 Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274-76.
s5 Id. at 274-75; see also id. at 279 (White, J., concurring) ("I agree with Justices Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens that the issues posed in the sentencing proceeding have a common-sense
core of meaning and that criminal juries should be capable of understanding them."). In a
later case, the Supreme Court reiterated that "from a legal point of view there is nothing
inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct." Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253, 278 (1984).
56 Jurek, 428 U.S. at 275-76.
1 Id. at 276.
58 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1023 n.9 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983).
60 Id. at 898.
61 See Jurek. 428 U.S. at 276.
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C. The Influence of the Incapacitation Rationale
After Furman, states were anxious to find a death penalty
procedure that would survive Supreme Court review. Following
Jurek, five additional states adopted statutes making future
dangerousness a factor supporting a death sentence, if proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.6 2 These states incorporated future dangerousness
in capital sentencing using similar or the same language as the Court
had approved in Jurek.6 3 But the states took different approaches to
future dangerousness. In three states-Idaho, Oklahoma, and
Wyoming-a finding of future dangerousness became a sufficient
reason to impose the death penalty for first-degree murder.6 4 The jury
still had to consider mitigating evidence, but it needed no further
aggravating factor to choose death. Oregon, like Texas, defined
capital murder more narrowly, so that a guilty verdict already
included aggravation;65 in those states, future dangerousness became
an additional requirement before a death sentence could be
imposed.66 In Virginia, future dangerousness became one of two
alternative conditions that the state had to prove before a death
sentence could be imposed.67 Two additional states-Colorado and
Washington-made lack of future dangerousness a statutory
mitigating factor6 8 (one that unfortunately opened the door to
62 Act of Mar. 21, 1977, ch. 154, § 4, 1977 Idaho Sess. Laws 393 (amending Idaho Code
§ 19-2515); Act of May 8, 1981, ch. 147, § 1, 1981 Okla. Sess. Laws 280 (amending Okla.
Stat. tit. 21, § 701.12); Act of Dec. 6, 1984, ch. 3, § 3, 1985 Or. Laws 22 (amending Or. Stat.
§§ 163.005-145); Acts of Assembly, 1977 Va. Acts 45 (adding §§ 19.2-264.4); Act of Mar.
6, 1989, ch. 171, § 1, 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws 295 (amending Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-102).
63 See, e.g., Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 146 (Va. 1978) ("In 1977,
following the pattern approved in Jurek, the General Assembly enacted the statutory
complex sub judice.").
64 Idaho Code § 19-2515(1), (3)(b), (7)(a) & (9) (2017); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §§ 701.9,
701.11-12 (2011); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-102(a), (e) & (h) (2017).
65 Act of Dec. 6, 1984, ch. 3, § 3, 1985 Or. Laws 21 ("Upon a finding that the defendant
is guilty of aggravated murder, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to
determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.").
66 See Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 163.095 (West 2015) (defining aggravated murder); Or. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 163.150(1)(b) & (f) (West 2015) (requiring a finding of future dangerousness);
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03 (West 2011) (defining capital murder); Tex. Code Crim. Pro.
Ann. art 37.071 § 2(b)(1) (West 2006) (requiring a finding of future dangerousness).
67 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-254.4(C) (Supp. 1982).
68 See Act of Aug. 7, 1979, ch. 158, § 1, 1979 Colo. Sess. Laws 674 (providing, as a
mitigating factor, that "[t]he defendant is not a continuing threat to society"); Act of May 14,
1981, ch. 138, § 7, 1981 Wash. Sess. Laws 539 (adding, as a "relevant factor[]" for the jury
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aggravating evidence of future dangerousness in rebuttal69 and turned
the jury's attention to future harm70).
This focus on future dangerousness was not a brief experiment.
Not one of these states has removed future dangerousness from
capital sentencing. In Idaho, Oklahoma, and Wyoming future
dangerousness offers sufficient aggravation to make murder a capital
crime; in Virginia it is a required finding, unless a capital murder is
found to have been especially vile; 7 2 in Texas and Oregon it is a
requirement in addition to other aggravation;7 3 and in Colorado and
Washin ton non-dangerousness serves as a supposed mitigating
factor.7
to consider when contemplating leniency, "[w]hether there is a likelihood that the defendant
will pose a danger to others in the future").
69 See, e.g., People v. Hamilton, 200 P.3d 898, 968 (Cal. 2009) ("Defendant argues the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he characterized a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole as a license to commit acts of violence .... [T]here was no
misconduct .... It was a proper comment on defendant's assertions that if given a sentence
of less than death he would not be a threat to others in prison."); State v. Rupe, 743 P.2d 210,
226 (Wash. 1987) (ruling that it was proper for the prosecutor to mention the possibility of
commutation to rebut the defendant's claim that he would not be dangerous to society if
sentenced to life in prison).
7o Berry, supra note 6, at 898 (contending that a defendant's "inability to prove the
absence of future dangerousness" may lead the jury to conclude "that the individual in
question should receive the death penalty").
n Oklahoma and Wyoming have made no amendments to the language regarding future
dangerousness. Compare Act of May 8, 1981, ch. 147, § 1, 1981 Okla. Sess. Laws 280 with
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.12 (West 2011) (same); compare Act of Mar. 6, 1989, ch. 171,
§ 1, 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws 295 (amending Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-102) with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-
2-102 (2017). Idaho has amended its future dangerousness provision only to allow
consideration of post-offense conduct as well. Compare Act of Mar. 28, 1977, ch. 154, § 4,
1977 Idaho Sess. Laws 393 (amending Idaho Code § 19-2515) ("The defendant, by prior
conduct or conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to
commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society.") with Idaho
Code § 19-2515 (2017) ("The defendant, by his conduct, whether such conduct was before,
during or after the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit
murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society.").
72 Compare Act of Mar. 29, 1977, ch. 492, § 1, 1977 Va. Acts 735 with Va. Code Ann.
§ 19.2-264.4 (2015) (same).
73 Compare Act of Dec. 6, 1984, ch. 3, § 3, 1985 Or. Laws 22 with Or. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 163.150 (West 2015) (same); compare Act of June 14, 1973, ch. 426, art. 3, § 1, 1973 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1125 with Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071 (West 2006) (same).
74 Compare Act of May 14, 1981, ch. 138, § 7, 1981 Wash. Sess. Laws 539 with Wash.
Rev. Code § 10.95.070 (2016) (same); compare Act of Aug. 7, 1979, ch. 158, § 1, 1979
Colo. Sess. Laws 674 with Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(k) (2017) (same).
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Neither federal courts nor state courts, meanwhile, have ordered
states to stop considering future dangerousness in these ways. Most
have deemed the constitutionality of such statutory provisions settled
by the Supreme Court's decision in Jurek.75 The Court itself has read
Jurek broadly to allow future dangerousness to "be treated as
establishing an 'aggravating factor' for purposes of capital
sentencing" 6-even though Jurek did not say that.7 7 State courts,
similarly, have declined to invalidate future dangerousness provisions
after noting that Jurek approved them.7 8
Many state courts have allowed future dangerousness to play a
dispositive role in capital sentencing, even without evidence of
legislative support for the incapacitation rationale. Future
dangerousness became a judicially approved non-statutory a ra-
vating factor in eleven stateS79-as well as under federal law. In
7 See, e.g. Bassett v. Commonwealth, 284 S.E.2d 844, 849 (Va. 1981) ("In [a previous
decision] we noted that the continuing-threat provision of [the Virginia death sentencing
law] mirrored a Texas provision approved in Jurek v. Texas, and we found no constitutional
vagueness in the statutory language . . . ." (citations omitted)); see also United States v.
Davis, 912 F. Supp. 938, 945 (E.D. La. 1996) (citing Jurek for the conclusion that future
dangerousness "is relevant and constitutional as a nonstatutory [aggravating] factor."). The
Supreme Court itself has consistently relied on its approval of the Texas statute in Jurek.
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986) (citation omitted).
7 Jurek, 428 U.S. at 270. The Jurek Court did not consider future dangerousness as an
aggravating factor, because the definition of capital murder in Texas's death penalty scheme
already limited the death penalty to specified types of aggravated intentional murder. Id.
("While Texas has not adopted a list of statutory aggravating circumstances the existence of
which can justify the imposition of the death penalty .. . its action in narrowing the
categories of murders for which a death sentence may ever be imposed serves much the
same purpose.") The Court therefore went beyond Jurek when it later concluded that future
dangerousness could be treated as an aggravating factor sufficient to justify death for a first-
defree murder. See Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5.
See, e.g., Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 148 (Va. 1978) ("The language
defining the first aggravating circumstance, i.e., the potential 'dangerousness' of the
defendant, is identical to that in the Texas statute upheld in Jurek .... We see no
constitutional vagueness in that language.").
79 People v. Ervin, 990 P.2d 506, 534 (Cal. 2000) ("[W]e have held that prosecutorial
argument regarding defendant's future dangerousness i permissible when based on evidence
of the defendant's conduct rather than expert opinion."); Ross v. State, 326 S.E.2d 194, 205
(Ga. 1985) ("Arguments addressing [future dangerousness] are not improper if based on
evidence adduced at trial."); State v. Clark, 220 So. 3d 583, 655 (La. 2016) (authorizing
testimony regarding future dangerousness at sentencing); State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527,
544 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (allowing the state to argue future dangerousness at capital
sentencing, as long as the evidence "did not suggest or imply the jurors would be directly
responsible or held accountable if [the defendant] harmed anyone else in the future");
Schoels v. State, 966 P.2d 735, 740 (Nev. 1998) ("[I]t was proper for the prosecution to
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these jurisdictions, the jury may consider future dangerousness when
deciding whether death is appropriate. At least one type of statutory
aggravation is required for any death sentence, but future
dangerousness can serve as an additional aggravating factor that tips
the scales toward death. The Supreme Court has condoned this
practice, holding in Simmons v. South Carolina that the state "is free
to argue that the defendant will pose a danger to others in prison and
that executing him is the only means of eliminating the threat to the
safety of other inmates or prison staff."8 1 In such cases, future
dangerousness erves as a relevant factor just like "mental capacity,
background, and age," and the Court has not imposed any burden of
proof on the prosecutor before the jury can take it into account as a
non-statutory aggravating factor.8 2
Statutory reforms and judicial decisions have thus entrenched
future dangerousness as a dispositive consideration in death
sentencing, under the lasting influence of the Supreme Court's
argue the future dangerousness of [defendant]."); State v. Williams, 510 S.E.2d 626, 644
(N.C. 1999) ("[I]t is not improper for a prosecutor to urge the jury to recommend death out
of concern for the future dangerousness of the defendant."); State v. Addison, 87 A.3d 1, 119
(N.H. 2013) ("[I]nformation that relates to future dangerousness as a legitimate aggravating
factor is relevant and admissible at capital sentencing."); State v. Beuke, 526 N.E.2d 274,
280 (Ohio 1988) (holding that requiring specific jury instruction to review a non-statutory
aggravating circumstance of future dangerousness would be reversible error, but "merely
arguing such in summation" was permissible); Commonwealth v. Trivigno, 750 A.2d 243,
254 (Pa. 2000) ("[I]t is not error for the prosecutor to argue a defendant's future
dangerousness. . . ."); State v. Tucker, 478 S.E.2d 260, 270 (S.C. 1996) ("The defendant's
future danger to society is a legitimate interest at sentencing." (citation omitted)); State v.
Young, 853 P.2d 327, 353 (Utah 1993) ("A jury may legitimately consider a defendant's
character, future dangerousness, lack of remorse, and retribution in the penalty phase
hearing.").
8 United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 290, 303-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[L]ower
courts have uniformly upheld future dangerousness as a non-statutory aggravating factor in
capital cases under the [Federal Death Penalty Act], including instances where such factor is
supported by evidence of low rehabilitative potential and lack of remorse."), aff'd sub
nom, In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2008).
81 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 165 n.5 (1994).
82 Id. at 163.
83 The Supreme Court has
rejected the notion that "a specific method for balancing mitigating and aggravating
factors in a capital sentencing proceeding is constitutionally required." Equally settled
is the corollary that the Constitution does not require a State to ascribe any specific
weight to particular factors, either in aggravation or mitigation, to be considered by
the sentencer.
Harris v. Alabama. 513 U.S. 504. 512 (1995) (citations omitted).
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plurality opinion in Jurek. Trial courts confronted with the use of
future dangerousness in capital sentencing understandably have
treated the validity of future dangerousness questions as settled, even
though, as Professor William Berry has pointed out, "the Court has
never explicitly addressed whether future dangerousness or
incapacitation alone could be a valid basis for the death penalty."84
The lethal consequences are difficult to overstate. Future
dangerousness findings have played a dispositive role in each of the
more than 550 executions in Texas and the two executions in Oregon
since Furman. 8 5 Scholars who have studied the way the death penalty
is imposed have described future dangerousness as a primary reason
for executions. One has called future dangerousness "the strongest
determinant of whether an individual receives the death penalty."86
Another has determined that future dangerousness served as a
"sentencing factor . .. directly underlying at least half of all modem
era executions and likely playing some role in the rest."87 Still
another has written that "future dangerousness predominates and
pervades capital-sentencing schemes across the country."'8  Future
dangerousness impacts federal death sentencing, too: one study found
that prosecutors raised claims of future dangerousness in 77% of
federal capital cases from 1995-2007.89
The incapacitation rationale, expressed through future
dangerousness inquiries at capital sentencing, thus has become a
84 Berry, supra note 6, at 913.
85 Execution Database, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-exec
utions-state-and-region-1976 [https://perma.cc/H2RB-LYYY] (last visited May 28, 2018);
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 163.150(l)(b) & (f) (West 2015); Tex. Code Crim Proc. Ann. art.
37.071 §§ 2(b)(1), (g) (West 2006).
8 Berry, supra note 6, at 893. In the same article, Berry stated that life without parole and
solitary confinement "provide the very alternative to death that eliminates dangerousness as
a valid reason for execution." Id. at 904; see also id. at 906 (arguing that a risk of future
dangerousness can be mitigated "by simply using the penitential structure already in place,
solitary confinement in particular"). He did not address moral trade-offs and legal questions
that that choice entails, as laid bare in Part II of this Article.
87 Shapiro, supra note 17, at 146 (citation omitted). Shapiro contends that an inquiry into
future dangerousness at sentencing distracts the jury from the more important question of
desert and introduces an unacceptable risk of prediction error. She dismisses the
incapacitation rationale for executions as indefensible. Id. at 168, 185.
88 Edmondson, supra note 13, at 917.
89 Mark D. Cunningham, Thomas J. Reidy, & Jon R. Sorensen, Assertions of "Future
Dangerousness" at Federal Capital Sentencing: Rates and Correlates of Subsequent Prison
Misconduct and Violence, 32 L. & Hum. Behav. 46, 47 (2008).
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dominant and dispositive factor in executions. The Supreme Court's
disruption of capital punishment in Furman resulted in statutory
narrowing of the death penalty, and an unintended accompanying
shift toward the instrumental question of future harm. Future
dangerousness then gained widespread judicial acceptance based
largely on the Supreme Court's decision in Jurek, even though the
substantive question of whether "the goal of incapacitation may
justify the death penalty"90 was one that the Jurek Court did not
decide. The dominant influence of future dangerousness today stems
from these surprisingly tangled roots.
II. Two OBJECTIONS TO THE INCAPACITATION RATIONALE
Despite the historical and practical importance of the
incapacitation rationale in capital sentencing, scholars tend to dismiss
future dangerousness as an invalid reason for the death penalty. A
critical review of death penalty literature and case law suggests two
explanations. Each lies in a mistaken objection to the incapacitation
rationale. One objection is based on the belief that incapacitation can
be achieved just as effectively through non-lethal means; this leads
some critics to conclude that the incapacitation rationale is irrelevant
to death penalty debates. A second objection is based on the belief
that predictions of violence are so unreliable that it would be arbitrary
and unjust to premise any execution upon them. Each of these
objections is seriously flawed. Current non-lethal alternatives turn out
to require cruel and degrading forms of restraint, or else to be
inadequate to stop future violence. The problem of prediction error,
on the other hand, is significant, but can be addressed and mitigated
through reevaluation of dangerousness over time. Accordingly, the
incapacitation rationale cannot be treated as irrelevant or inherently
unjust. It should be a core focus of academic and judicial discourse,
both because future dangerousness is actually driving so many death
sentences, and because it implicates moral and legal choices too
challenging and consequential to ignore.




Centuries ago, long-term incarceration did not exist as a feasible
alternative to the execution of dangerous offenders.9 1 Other
punishments, such as exile or transportation to foreign lands,9 2
sometimes offered an alternative means to protect society from these
offenders, but these means required enforcement and resources.9 3 The
death penalty remained the clearest and most efficient mode of
incapacitation.
The alternative of incarceration has since changed the debate.
Many scholars and judges critical of capital punishment now discard
the incapacitation rationale for capital punishment on the ground that
carceral alternatives can also incapacitate. They contend that solitary
confinement and life imprisonment without parole, in particular, offer
practical, sufficient, and morally superior alternatives to execution.
Some of these critics contend that the risk of future violence by
capital murderers is overblown. In his influential book, The Limits of
the Criminal Sanction, Professor Herbert Packer argued that the
incapacitation rationale cannot justify capital punishment because
murderers as a class are unlikely to kill again. He argued that
"[i]icapacitation is a relevant claim only if it can be shown that a
high proportion of people who engage in a particular form of conduct
are likely to go on doing so unless restrained. Very few murderers
kill again; that incapacitative claim is weak."9 4 In Furman, Justice
Marshall made a similar argument:
91 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Sanction of Imprisonment for
Serious Crime, 5 J. Legal Stud. 35, 36 (1976) (stating that death and maiming "were the
ordinary penalties for serious crime in the Western legal systems in the later Middle Ages"
because they were easy to administer and did not require prisons or penitentiaries).
92 Id. at 54 ("[T]he decline in England's 'penal death rate' came about because of the
development of an alternative to the blood sanctions: transportation of convicts for terms of
labor as indentured servants in the overseas colonies." (citation omitted)); id. at 58 ("The
American revolutionary war interrupted England's export of convicts in the 1770s. As a
stopgap, which in fact lasted until the foundations of the modern prison system in the mid-
nineteenth century, the government 'decided to moor hulks on the Thames, put convicts in
them and work them at hard labor."' (citation omitted)).
93 Id. at 59 (describing the transportation and galley systems that became alternatives to
capital punishment as "an administrative feat, in organizing and refining relatively complex
schemes to extract convict labor").
94 Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 269 (1968).
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[I]f a murderer is executed, he cannot possibly commit another
offense. The fact is, however, that murderers are extremely unlikely
to commit other crimes either in prison or upon their release. For
the most part, they are first offenders, and when released from
prison they are known to become model citizens.95
These criticisms are weak. One weakness lies in Packer's and
Justice Marshall's idea that the incapacitation rationale for capital
punishment is irrelevant if most murderers will not commit future
crimes. The incapacitation rationale still may be relevant and
important for a subcategory of murderers who remain dangerous. The
problem of overbreadth can be readily addressed by making
individual rather than categorical judgments about the future
dangerousness of capital offenders, as this author has proposed
elsewhere.96 The incapacitation rationale does not become irrelevant
simply because the risk is limited to a subset of capital murderers.
Another flaw lies in the apparent assumption, reflected in Packer's
argument, that only fatal violence should be considered. In fact, from
a utilitarian perspective, the incapacitation rationale need not be
limited to preventing violence that is fatal. Society might benefit
from executing a criminal even if he is predicted to commit only
future rapes, for example, if the utility of preventing those rapes
outweighs the harm of his execution.9 7 The logic of the incapacitation
rationale applies where future risks are non-lethal as well as lethal,
unless one further concludes that even multiple non-lethal crimes can
never be more harmful than an execution, that punishment must
comply with a strong proportionality requirement, or that human life
has value beyond mere utility. 98 Absent such constraints, the death
penalty might be defended to prevent lesser harms-at least if the
penalty is deserved as a predicate, retributive matter. That is, in fact,
95 Furman, 408 U.S. at 355 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
96 Cf. Marah Stith McLeod, Does the Death Penalty Require Death Row? The Harm of
Legislative Silence, 77 Ohio St. L.J. 525, 551 (2016) ("Security needs do not require a death
sentence to be dispositive for automatic and permanent placement on death row. Individual
assessments of death-sentenced offenders offer a way to determine which inmates require
more restrictive confinement-assessments that are made routinely for noncapital prisoners."
(citation omitted)).
9 Cf. Richard J. Bonnie, et al., Criminal Law 21 (4th ed. 2015) ("By itself, incapacitation
as a method of preventing future crimes by the incapacitated person may justify sentencing
the thief to a term of life imprisonment.")
98 Packer may have assumed such a constraint, but he did not spell out or explain it.
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how most states approach the question of future dangerousness. Of
the half-dozen states that have statutes making future dangerousness
necessary or sufficient for the death penalty, only one-Idaho-
requires the future danger to be lethal.99 The other five-Texas,
Virginia, Oklahoma, Oregon and Wyoming-simply require a
likelihood of future violence.' 0
A third mistake can be discerned in Justice Marshall's discussion
of comparative rates of violence. He contends that if murderers tend
to commit less violence in prison than inmates sentenced for non-
lethal crimes, then incapacitation cannot justify the death penalty for
murderers, given that we do not execute those non-lethal offenders.
But the reason we do not execute persons who committed non-lethal
crimes is because they do not deserve the death penalty.101 Marshall's
empirical claim that murderers as a class are less likely to commit
violence in prison than prisoners who committed non-lethal crimes is
therefore not decisive, even if it is accurate.1 0 2
Many critics reject the incapacitation rationale for reasons other
than the flawed arguments described above. These critics often admit
that some capital murderers remain dangerous and that their
incapacitation is a legitimate concern, but argue that non-lethal
punishments also incapacitate. Three Supreme Court Justices have
espoused this view. Justice Stevens has argued that "[i]n capital
sentencing decisions . . . incapacitation is largely irrelevant, at least
when the alternative of life imprisonment without possibility of
99 Idaho requires that he defendant be found to have a "propensity to commit murder
which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society." Idaho Code § 19-2515(9)(i)
(2017) (emphasis added).
100 See supra notes 44, 64-66, 72-74 and accompanying text.
101 The Court has permitted incapacitation without desert where its purpose is regulatory
and non-punitive. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 365-66 (1997). The Court
thus has condoned civil commitment. Its rule elsewhere against the execution of the
intellectually disabled may imply, however, that incapacitation by means of death would not
be permissible in a civil context, where desert is not an issue. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
102 Studies have indicated that "a murder conviction is not predictive of a greater risk of
prison violence relative to a conviction for some other offense." Jon Sorensen & Mark D.
Cunningham, Conviction Offense and Prison Violence: A Comparative Study of Murderers
and Other Offenders, 56 Crime & Delinquency 103, 123 (2010). And "research has
consistently found the true incidence of recidivism among murderers released from prison to
be much lower than for other types of parolees." Jonathan R. Sorensen & Rocky L. Pilgrim,
An Actuarial Risk Assessment of Violence Posed by Capital Murder Defendants, 90 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 1251, 1254 (2000) (citation omitted).
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parole is available" 03 (which it is in all states todayl04). He has
conceded that incapacitation is a rational basis for punishment, and
that it "would be served by execution," but has contended that "in
view of the availability of imprisonment as an alternative means of
preventing the defendant from violating the law in the future, the
death sentence would clearly be an excessive response to this
concern."10 5 Similarly, Justice Breyer has rejected the incapacitation
rationale on the ground that "the major alternative to capital
punishment-namely, life in prison without possibility of parole-
also incapacitates." 6 ustice Marshall shared this objection as
well. 107
Critics of the incapacitation rationale also often invoke the option
of solitary confinement. Justice Marshall contended that the death
penalty could not "be seriously defended as necessary to insulate the
public from persons likely to commit crimes in the future" because
"[1]ife imprisonment and, if necessary, solitar confinement, would
fully accomplish the aim of incapacitation."' 0 Berry has made the
same point:
If death is the only way to incapacitate a particular offender, then
future dangerousness can serve as a valid justification for capital
punishment . .. [but] it is not difficult to minimize, if not eliminate,
any risk of dangerousness by simply using the penitential structure
already in place, solitary confinement in particular.109
Other scholars have described "better security" and "increased
punishments like solitary confinement" as "alternatives" to the death
penalty for dangerous prisoners.1 10 Such scholars recognize that some
capital offenders are truly dangerous, but see solitary confinement
and life imprisonment as adequate and morally superior alternatives.
103 Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 517 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104 Shapiro, supra note 17, at 151 n. 23.
105 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 477-78 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
06 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2767 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
107 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1023 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
10 Id.
109 Berry, supra note 6, at 904, 906.
110 Amy V. Coney & John H. Garvey, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 Marq. L. Rev.
303, 311-12 (1998) (hypothesizing why Pope John Paul II concluded that few executions, if
any, would be necessary to the defense of society).
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Critics who cite the existence of these non-lethal alternatives
believe that they render the death penalty unnecessary and unjust,
usually based on some form of what Professor Hugo Bedau called the
principle of "minimal invasion.""'1 This principle holds that
"[g]overnmental invasions of an individual's privacy, liberty, and
autonomy (or other fundamental values) are justified only if no less
invasive practice is sufficient to achieve an important social goal." 1 2
Critics like Bedau contend that the death penalty is "by its very
nature . .. more severe, invasive, and irremediable than the
alternative which, for all practical purposes in contemporary society,
is long-term imprisonment."113 They conclude that only non-lethal
punishments are morally permissible. 1 14
A closer look at solitary confinement and life without parole,
however, casts doubt on the underlying assumption that the death
penalty is necessarily more "severe, invasive, and irremediable" than
these non-lethal alternatives. The almost grotesque inhumanity of
long-term solitary confinement may not be better than death, and life
without parole may entail equally inhumane conditions in order to
prevent prisoner violence. Furthermore, death sentences are much
more closely scrutinized, and though only a death sentence is truly
irrevocable, erroneous life sentences are much less likely to be
corrected.
These considerations do not prove that the proposed non-lethal
alternatives are actually worse than death, but they do show that their
moral superiority-or even their moral permissibility-is far from
clear. It is true that persons who believe that human life is sacred or
inviolable may see non-lethal punishments as the only morally
permissible ones. But such claims are rarely invoked explicitly in
judicial or academic argument, and if they were, they would end
111 Hugo Adam Bedau, The Minimal Invasion Argument Against the Death Penalty, 21
Crim. Just. Ethics 3, 4 (2002).
112 Id.
113 Id. The Supreme Court likewise has opined that "[t]here is no question that death as a
punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187
(1976) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
114 See also Matthew H. Kramer, The Ethics of Capital Punishment: A Philosophical
Investigation of Evil and Its Consequences 151-52 (2011) ("Because alternative sanctions of
lesser severity can fully realize any legitimate incapacitative ends, the employment of the
death penalty in pursuit of such ends is always impermissible under the Minimal Invasion
Principle.").
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discussion of the death penalty on retribution and deterrence
rationales as well. This Article is not intended to challenge those who
hold such a belief. Instead, it disputes the claim that the existence of
non-lethal alternatives, without more, renders the incapacitation
rationale irrelevant to death penalty discourse. The choice is far more
morally and legally complex.
1. Solitary Confinement
Critics who argue that the death penalty is unnecessary because of
solitary confinement rarely stop to consider the severity and cruelty
of that alternative in making this claim. However, an enormous body
of research and scholarship has revealed that extraordinary harms
follow from prolonged and even short-term solitary confinement.
Critics describe it as a form of torture.1 15 Studies have demonstrated
that extreme psychological, physical, and spiritual damage can result
from such isolation. Some prisoners go insane; others become
violent; others fall into severe depression; some commit suicide.116
One study found prisoners in solitary confinement five times more
likely to commit suicide than other prisoners. In order to kill
themselves "in a bare cell ... [slome prisoners have resorted
to jumping head-first off their bunks; others have bitten through the
veins in their arms."1 l7 For those who remained alive after years in
solitary confinement, their ability to interact safely with others
outside isolation was reduced, if not eliminated. Such confinement
may impair a person's ability to reason, undercutting his capacity for
self-reflection, self-control, and rehabilitation. The enduring
deprivation of social interaction may take away what is
quintessentially human-a person's ability to reason and relate to
others-and may completely destroy the human mind and spirit.
Courts have expressed grave concerns regarding the moral and
legal permissibility of prolonged solitary confinement. The European
115 See, e.g., Atul Gawande, Hellhole, The New Yorker, Mar. 30, 2009 (arguing that
"[w]hether in Walpole or Beirut or Hanoi, all human beings experience isolation as torture,"
and calling solitary confinement "legalized torture").
116 See, e.g., James Ridgeway & Jean Casella, What Death Penalty Opponents Don't Get:
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Court of Human Rights famously refused to extradite a capital
defendant to the United States to face a death penalty trial in
Virginia, because the court feared he would be subjected to solitary
confinement and other "inhuman or degrading" conditions while on
death row.' Though the United States Supreme Court has never
forbidden solitary confinement for dangerous prisoners, it has long
recognized the extraordinary harms that can follow from such
isolation. In the 1890 case of In re Medley, the Court noted that even
a short period of solitary confinement can cause irreparable harm to
the prisoner.1 19 The Court observed that these harms befell prisoners
who were isolated in cells of "considerable size;"l20 today, prisoners
are held in solitary confinement for twenty-three hours a day in cells
often "no larger than a typical parking spot."'21 In a recent opinion
criticizing the use of solitary confinement, Justice Kennedy described
how prisoners living in such conditions are given only one hour of
out-of-cell time a day, and "allowed little or no opportunity for
conversation or interaction with anyone."122 He warned that these
conditions may bring prisoners "to the edge of madness, perhaps to
madness itself." 2 3
The Supreme Court has taken an increasingly hard line against the
practice of prolonged solitary confinement in the non-capital
context.124 In Wilkinson v. Austin, the Supreme Court held that a
maximum security inmate had a due process interest in avoiding
placement in solitary confinement, and that the state could not put
118 Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 91 (1989). The European
Court described these conditions as a "death row phenomenon" that violates Article 3 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. Id. at ¶¶ 56, 99, 111.
119 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890).
120 Id.
121 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also, e.g.,
Am. Civil Liberties Union of Tex., A Solitary Failure: The Waste, Cost and Harm of Solitary
Confinement in Texas 2 n.9 (Feb. 2015),
https://www.aclutx.org/sites/default/files/field documents/SolitaryReport 2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9AU9-722Z] ("The average size of a solitary-confinement cell in Texas is
sixty square feet. . . .").
122 Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2208 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
123 Id. at 2209 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124 Challenges to long-term solitary confinement by death row prisoners have usually
failed. See, e.g., Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 254-55 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that death-
sentenced prisoners have no due process right to challenge permanent solitary confinement
on death row because death row is "tethered" to any death sentence).
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him there without justification and without periodic review.125 In
separate opinions, Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer, and Justice
Stevens have criticized the practice of long-term solitary
confinement, and have raised the possibility of ir M osing
constitutional limits if states do not curb its use on their own.
Lower courts have condemned solitary confinement in even more
emphatic terms. The Third Circuit recently held that prisoners
sentenced to life in prison "have a due process right to be
free from indefinite conditions of solitary confinement."' The court
explained that "scientific research and the evolving jurisprudence has
made the harms of solitary confinement clear: Mental well-being and
one's sense of self are at risk. We can think of few values more
worthy of constitutional protection than these core facets of human
dignity." 12 8 The court pointed to studies showing that "psychological
stressors such as isolation can be as clinically distressing as physical
torture" and cited a case involving a prisoner who had "deteriorated
to the point of social death as a direct result of his continued
isolation."129  In that case, "the damage of indefinite solitary
confinement was ... severe, certain, and irreparable."1 3 0
Such condemnation of solitary confinement is not an anomaly. As
the Third Circuit explained, it was only "addringl rits] jurisprudential
voice to thle] growing chorus" of academic and judicial opponents of
long-term solitary confinement.1 31 Just recently, a federal district
court enjoined Virginia prison administrators from subjecting even
death row prisoners to extended solitary confinement, because such
125 545 U.S. 209, 214, 230 (2005) (holding that inmates had a due process liberty interest
in avoiding assignment to a "highly restrictive form of solitary confinement" in the state's
supermax prison).
126 See, e.g., Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2208-10 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (objecting to the
inhumanity of long-term solitary confinement); Ruiz v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1246, 1247 (2017)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of a stay of execution) (noting the "human toll" and
"terrible psychiatric price" of extended solitary confinement and urging the Court to decide
whether extended isolation survives Eighth Amendment scrutiny (citations omitted));
Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1115 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari) (deeming the "dehumanizing effects" of long-term isolation "undeniable").
127 Williams v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corrs., 848 F.3d 549, 574-75 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128 Id. at 574 (citations omitted).
129 Id. (citing Johnson v. Wetzel, 209 F. Supp. 3d 766, 774 (M.D. Pa. 2016)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
130 Id. at 573 (describing the district court's decision).
131 Id. at 574.
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confinement takes away "a core element of what it means to be
human."1 3 2 The court defended its injunction on the ground that
deliberate indifference to the "potential harm that the lack of human
interaction on death row could cause" would violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.13 3
The growing chorus of solitary confinement critics includes
religious leaders, as well. Pope Francis, for example, recently
condemned the use of solitary confinement-and more broadly "high
security prisons"-as an affront to human dignity.13 4 Similarly,
Anthony Granado, policy advisor to the U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops, has stated: "Punishment is just and right, but we don't want
to dehumanize people and make them worse ... They are created in
the image and likeness of God." 3 5 For such critics, solitary
confinement is not a morally acceptable safeguard against prisoner
violence. The voices of these critics are being heard: over the last five
years, several states and the federal government have taken
significant steps to reduce the use of solitary confinement,
particularly for juveniles and the mentally ill. 1 36
One would think that so debilitating a condition as solitary
confinement at least would be adequate to completely incapacitate
prisoners and protect others. But even that is not true. Studies and
cases have shown that even prisoners in solitary confinement can
continue to perpetrate violence, particularly if they are part of
organized gangs. A lengthy report on criminal activity in a California
super-maximum security prison discovered that gang members, held
132 Porter v. Clarke, 290 F.Supp.3d 518, 530 (E.D. Va. 2018) (citing the report of a clinical
psychologist, who explained that long-term solitary confinement causes psychological
damage and that the coping mechanisms that prisoners adapt to deal with prolonged isolation
may cause still further harm) (internal quotation marks omitted).3 Id. at 532.
134 Pope Francis, Address of Pope Francis to the Delegates of the International
Association of Penal Law (Oct. 23, 2014), https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/
speeches/2014/october/documents/papa-francesco_20141023_associazione-internazionale-
diritto-penale.html [https://perma.cc/ZY92-XE3A] (arguing that "high security prisons"
amount to a "form of torture" inconsistent with "the pro homine principle, meaning the
digity of the human person above every thing else").
Matt Hadro, Why There's a Backlash Against Solitary Confinement in U.S. Prisons,
Crux (Dec. 26, 2016), https://cruxnow.com/cna/2016/12/26/theres-backlash-solitary-confin
ement-u-s-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/6ZUM-S756].
136 See, e.g., Priyanka Boghani, Reducing Solitary Confinement, One Cell at a Time,
P.B.S. Frontline (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/reducing-
solitary-confinement-one-cell-at-a-time/ [https://perma.cc/JZ28-XVKU].
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in isolation and unable to interact with or see one another, continued
to communicate using bedsheet strings to "fish" notes down prison
hallways, and smuggled gang orders out of prison within documents
made to seem like privileged legal communications.137 Despite
efforts, prison officials were unable to stop this activity.138
Long-term solitary confinement does not present an easy
alternative to the death penalty. For murderers who are extremely
dangerous and who cannot be confined safely except by solitary
confinement or execution,139 it is not clear that solitary confinement
is the more morally or legally acceptable alternative. It may be that
restraining a person in near-total isolation corrodes his mind and
spirit so dreadfully that it may be at greater odds with the "concept of
human dignity at the core of the [Eighth] Amendment"14 0 than would
be his execution.
Only if one believes that human life is intrinsically sacred or
inviolable,141 or worth preserving even at the cost of human
happiness or sanity, can one conclude that solitary confinement may
or ought to be chosen instead of execution to incapacitate enduringly
137 Lesley Stahl, Gangs Thrive in Maximum-Security Prison, CBS News (May 12, 2005),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/gangs-thrive-in-maximum-security/; see also infra note 195
and accompanying text (citing reports of violence on death row).
138 Stahl, supra note 137.
, See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Final Report: Report and Recommendations
Concerning the Use of Restrictive Housing 1 (Jan. 2016) (concluding "that there are
occasions when correctional officials have no choice but to segregate inmates from the
general population, typically when it is the only way to ensure the safety of inmates, staff,
and the public and the orderly operation of the facility.").
140 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (plurality opinion).
141 The idea that human life has inestimable or unique value, or must be respected as
inviolable for some other reason apart from any utilitarian considerations, explains many of
the concerns relating to the death penalty, though it is not always recognized by those who
raise these concerns. For example, the risk of executing an innocent person raises far more
concern than an erroneous sentence of life without parole (or even many erroneous sentences
of life without parole), though error in non-lethal sentences is much less likely to be
corrected, see infra notes 150-155. Similarly, concern regarding racial discrimination in
capital sentencing has been cited as a reason to abolish the death penalty, but abolition has
not been suggested for a host of other punishments imposed more frequently and with, quite
possibly, as much unfairness. For persons who claim life is sacred, the difference requires no
further explanation. But must our society conclude that human life has inestimable or unique
value? The Supreme Court has said yes, but its reason is unsatisfying: "Death, in its finality,
differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a
year or two." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion). That
begs the question of why the finality of death matters so much, particularly since non-capital
sentencing errors are much less likely to be corrected.
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dangerous capital offenders. Faith or natural law theory may lead
some to embrace the sacredness and inviolability of human life, but
such premises are not shared by all in our secular society. Reasonable
persons seeking in good faith the welfare of society and the
promotion of human dignity may end up disagreeing as to whether
the death penalty should be replaced with solitary confinement, even
assuming that condition can fully incapacitate.
2. Life Without Parole
But solitary confinement is not the only non-lethal alternative.
Many commentators point to life imprisonment as the logical and
adequate alternative to execution for prisoners who will remain
violent. A closer examination of this alternative reveals two
significant problems. On the one hand, life in prison may not
incapacitate truly dangerous prisoners.14 2 On the other hand, if it does
incapacitate them, that is most likely because it entails the same kinds
of isolation and restraint that make solitary confinement so inhumane.
For threatening, capital offenders, this non-lethal alternative still
leaves us with agonizing future choices of either dangerous
inadequacy or torturous restraint.
Turning first to the question of adequacy, it is readily apparent that
life without parole may not prevent dangerous capital offenders from
committing future violence.14 3 A lengthy report by the American
Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") described the violence that prisoners
sentenced to life without parole routinely encounter: "More than 75
percent (76.9 percent) of the prisoners surveyed by the ACLU
reported that they had been assaulted or had witnessed other prisoners
being assaulted [or] raped. . . .,,144 The report found that the "day-to-
day lives [of life without parole prisoners] are marked by lack of
privacy, shakedowns, lockdowns, full-body searches, and extensive
142 See infra notes 143-146 and accompanying text.
143 See, e.g. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 465-66 (1993) ("Thomas Creech has
admitted to killing or participating in the killing of at least 26 people . . .. Creech has said
repeatedly that, unless he is completely isolated from humanity, he likely will continue
killing . . . . Creech's most recent victim was David Dale Jensen, a fellow inmate in the
maximum security unit of the Idaho State Penitentiary. When he killed Jensen, Creech was
already serving life sentences for other first-degree murders.").
144 Am. Civil Liberties Union, A Living Death: Life Without Parole for Nonviolent
Offenses 187 (Nov. 2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/111813-lwop-complete-
report.pdf#page =189 [https://perma.cc/GU77-WGFE].
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and intrusive control over every aspect of their lives ... . They
witness-and constantly fear-violence, assault, sexual abuse, and
,,145rape. One prisoner recounted:
I have seen men with their throats cut, their bellies cut open with their
guts hanging out ... and I have seen men with knives stuck deep into
their skulls and more. I have seen men stomped into vegetative states
and with all their teeth kicked out. A man died in my arms. 146
It is evident that life without parole, without more, is not fully
incapacitating. Life-long incarceration protects those outside prison
walls from dangerous inmates but leaves fellow inmates vulnerable to
attack without means of self-protection or the ability to retreat.
To stem this violence, prisoners sentenced to life without parole
are frequently subjected to solitary confinement.14 7 Studies reveal
that unless (and perhaps even if) life without parole is coupled with
severe restrictions and isolation, it may not suffice to protect others
from very dangerous capital offenders. This requires us again to ask
whether this alternative is really more defensible than execution-a
question that depends on competing normative commitments such as
the state's moral and constitutionall4 8 duty to protect those in its
custody and service, the importance of human dignity, and the value
of human life. One cannot reach a deliberate and reasoned approach
to those trade-offs if one simply ignores the threat of future danger on
the ground that life without parole is an option.
Those who cite life without parole as a reason to ignore the
incapacitation rationale for execution seem to overlook another facet
of inhumanity in that alternative, as well. Like the death penalty, life
without parole reflects an absolute and irrevocable condemnation of
the prisoner. It denies him all hope of social rehabilitation or
restoration to the human community. In a recent case barring life
without parole for juvenile offenders, the Supreme Court concluded
that such offenders are not sufficiently culpable to deserve a penalty
145 Id.
146 Id. at 188 (quoting prisoner Paul Free).
147 Id.
148 See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994) ("[A]s the lower courts
have uniformly held. . . 'prison officials have a duty . .. to protect prisoners from violence
at the hands of other prisoners' . . . . Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not 'part of
the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.' (citations
omitted)).
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that "forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal" and that represents
"an irrevocable judgment about that person's value and place in
society."1 49 The hopelessness of life without parole,1 50 made more
cruel when coupled with solitarr confinement, has led some critics to
denounce it as a "living death"' 1 and even "worse than death."l5 2
Those who conclude that the death penalty is unnecessarily harsh
also rely too heavily upon the assertion that the death penalty is
irremediable. The matter is more complicated. It is true that only
execution is irrevocable. But capital sentencing errors are far more
likely to be remedied than errors in non-capital sentences, because
death sentences receive special scrutiny. The Supreme Court has held
that due process requires "heightened reliability" for a sentence of
death.15 Statistics bear out the results. One study found that federal
habeas petitions were granted in capital cases at a rate thirty-five
times higher than in non-capital cases.15 4 Another found that "courts
(or State Governors) are 130 times more likel to exonerate a
defendant where a death sentence is at issue."' 5 In contrast, life
149 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010).
Iso In theory, a state might seek intramural rehabilitation of those sentenced to life without
parole and to death. Indeed, that was an aim of the death penalty in early America. See
McLeod, supra note 96, at 552-53. And one scholar recently argued that society should care
more about the rehabilitation of death-sentenced prisoners. See Meghan Ryan, Death and
Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1231, 1282-83 (2013). To others, life without parole
sentences and death sentences have no such aim. See, e.g., Brandon Garrett, The Moral
Problem of Life-Without-Parole Sentences, Time (Oct. 26, 2017), http://time.com/4998858
/death-penalty-life-without-parole/ (noting that 50,000 prisoners in America are serving life
without parole "sentences that offer them no possibility of release or rehabilitation").
"' Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 144. There are prisoners who would prefer death
to life in prison without parole. William A. "Corky" Snyder was one: he "waived the
presentation of any mitigating evidence and urged the jury to sentence him to death." Snyder
v. State, 893 So. 2d 488, 505 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003). This author assisted in representing
Snyder on post-conviction review in the Alabama courts, and tried to persuade him to fight
for his life. Snyder had a powerful claim for relief from his death sentence, but he knew that
would mean life in prison. He committed suicide on July 12, 2011, his appeal still pending.
152 Ridgeway & Casella, supra note 116.
153 Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 72, 85 (1987).
154 See Nancy J. King, Fred L. Cheesman II & Brian J. Ostrom, Final Technical Report:
Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts: An Empirical Study of Habeas Corpus Cases Filed
by State Prisoners Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, at 10
(Aug. 2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/219558.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5XW-
WPXV] (finding that the federal habeas petitions were granted in capital cases at a rate
thirt -five times higher than in non-capital ones).
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2757 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer
has observed that this disparity "must reflect the fact that courts scrutinize capital cases more
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without parole sentences "receive no special consideration on appeal,
which limits the possibility they will be reduced or reversed."5 6
When it comes to error, a death sentence can make a vital difference.
Death sentences also garner the scrutiny of abolitionist attorneys.
The story of death row exoneree Joseph Amrine illustrates how
important that can be. Amrine was convicted of killing a fellow
prisoner, though he was innocent. Amrine realized that only a death
sentence would garner the attention of abolitionist attorneys and offer
him hope of eventual freedom. If he were sentenced to life in prison,
he would die in prison. So Amrine asked the jury for death, and the
jury granted his wish.157 Over the years that followed, his case
captured the attention of abolitionist attorneys and death penalty
critics, and he was exonerated.15 8 In the end, his death sentence saved
his life.
These considerations reveal that the proposed non-lethal
alternatives are not the obviously superior alternatives to the death
penalty that scholars like Bedau have claimed.159 They are extremely
severe, and may bring condemnation and suffering to the offender
that are even less revocable than a sentence of death.
Furthermore, even with all this harshness, the non-lethal alternative
of life without parole may be inadequate to protect the lives and
safety of others. It may protect those who live in free society outside
closely," though, in his view, "it likely also reflects a greater likelihood of an initial
wrongful conviction," because the "horrendous" nature of capital murders leads to "intense
community pressure ... to secure a conviction." Id.
15 Am. Civil Liberties Union of N. Cal., The Truth About Life Without Parole:
Condemned to Die in Prison, https://www.aclunc.org/article/truth-about-life-without-parole-
condemned-die-prison [https://perma.cc/5JLM-4ZZS] (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).
157 Backed into a Corner, Interview with Joseph Amrine by Ira Glass, This American Life
by WBEZ (originally aired Apr. 15, 2005), https://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-
archives/episode/287/transcript [https://perma.cc/RB9N-UGV4].
158 Lee Strubinger, Professor's Documentary Saved Innocent Man from Death Row,
Vidette Online (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.videtteonline.com/features/professor-s-
documentary-saved-innocent-man-from-death-row/articlead798d99-16a5-570a-aO7f-
4fl5ldl7O6fa.html [https://perma.cc/7FAY-JQS8].
15 Substitution of life without parole for the death penalty has brought simultaneously an
expansion of the offenses subject to life without parole: "It is clear that life without parole's
purpose of offering an alternative to the death penalty, has far outstripped its proponents'
goal. The result is not an abandonment of the death penalty, but an embrace of permanent
incarceration for noncapital crimes." Note, A Matter of Life and Death: The Effect of Life-
Without-Parole Statutes on Capital Punishment, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1838, 1852 (2006).
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the prison walls, for the risk of prisoner escape may be small 6 0 and
can be mitigated through perimeter security measures; but it may not
ensure safety for those who live in the society within the prison
walls-inmates, prison guards (who are often unarmed 61), medical
staff, chaplains, and the visiting families and friends of prisoners.
Some might have little sympathy for violent criminals who may be
potential victims, but "[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is simply
not 'part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses
against society."' 6 2 Some number of capital murderers are likely to
commit future acts of violence against their fellow prisoners or prison
guards,1 6 3 and government has the right and the responsibility to
160 Some evidence exists regarding the rate of violence perpetrated during escapes, but
there is little disaggregation of the data for capital and non-capital prisoners. See, e.g.,
Richard F. Culp, Frequency and Characteristics of Prison Escapes in the United States: An
Analysis of National Data, 85 Prison J. 270, 285, 287 (2005). Anecdotes are easier to find.
See, e.g., Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 55-58 (2009) (recounting the petitioner's escape
after arrest, second escape after conviction for capital murder, and third escape after
recapture).
161 See, e.g., Dana Liebelson, The Shooting Gallery, Huff. Post, http://highline.huffington
post.com/articles/en/the-shooting-gallery/ [https://perma.cc/4KFR-D5PV] (last visited Apr.
16, 2018) ("Multiple corrections experts confirmed that it is rare for a guard inside a prison
have access to a gun, let alone shoot one . . .. Only 15 states out of 50 responded to requests
to provide details on their prison firearms policies. None of them-including the large prison
systems of Texas and Ohio-reported using guns for everyday inmate management.").;
Barnini Chakraborty, 'My Son Might Be Here': After Tragedy, Prison Guards Being
Allowed to Carry Pepper Spray, Fox News Politics (March 21, 2015),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/03/2 1/prison-guard-pepper-spray.html
[https://perma.cc/B4F6-UJ88] ("Ironically, security guards at malls and office buildings
across the country have more self-defense tools at their disposal than most correction
officers guarding dangerous criminals.").
162 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citation omitted).
163 Some statistics offer insight into rates of violence. Perhaps most informative is a study
conducted after Missouri eliminated its death row and integrated former death-row prisoners
into the general prison population. Researchers found that 22.8% of the death-sentenced
prisoners committed violent misconduct on average per year of the study. Mark D.
Cunningham, Thomas J. Reidy & Jon R. Sorensen, Is Death Row Obsolete? A Decade of
Mainstreaming Death-Sentenced Inmates in Missouri, 23 Behav. Sci. & L. 307, 314 (2005).
A study of Texas death row prisoners found that they committed 505 serious offenses in a
twelve-year period. J. Keith Price, Roselyn K. Polk & Robert E. Beckley, Criminal Acts of
Violence Among Capital Murder Offenders in Texas, 3 J. Crim. & Crim. Just. Res. & Educ.
(2009),http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=1 0. .1.564.7644&rep=rep 1 &type
=pdf [https://perma.cc/M5PD-DHDV]. A book tracing the lives of the death row prisoners
whose sentences were commuted in light of Furman provides further insight. See Joan M.
Cheever, Back from the Dead (2006). The book recounts that of the 589 inmates whose
sentences were commuted from death to life, 322 had been released on parole by 2006. Id. at
4. Fourteen of those Furman-commuted inmates had killed again by that year; five had killed
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protect prisoners and guards from them, particularly if prison
restrictions render these potential victims exposed and defenseless.1 64
Where then does this leave us? For one, it is clear that non-lethal
alternatives do not render the incapacitation rationale for capital
punishment irrelevant. Future violence cannot be avoided by such
non-lethal means without different and perhaps more severe harms.
That does not mean that society must impose the death penalty on
dangerous murderers rather than accept their likelihood of continued
violence or subject them to torturous forms of restraint.165 However,
just as the death penalty should not remain part of our law only as
"the product of habit and inattention rather than an acceptable
deliberative process,"1 66  neither should these alternatives be
embraced without reasoned deliberation and a clear view of the
harms that they entail.
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens recognized in their plurality
opinion in Gregg v. Georgia that the Supreme Court "may not require
the legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so long as the
penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the
crime involved."1 67 A decision regarding the relative inhumanity and
harms of lethal and non-lethal alternatives is one that current
constitutional jurisprudence leaves to legislatures. That makes good
sense; the fraught moral choice to defend certain lives over others
should be made,168 if it must be made, by the branch that is most
representative of the mores of the people as a whole.
while released on parole, and nine had killed while still in prison. Id. at 206. Another ten of
the prisoners who had not been released had committed suicide. Id. at 36. See also James W.
Marquart & Jonathan R. Sorensen, A National Study of the Furman-Commuted Inmates:
Assessing the Threat to Society from Capital Offenders, 23 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 5, 27 (1989)
(finding that in the fifteen years after Furman, 239 Furman-commuted prisoners had been
released from prison and that "[s]even . . . Furman-commuted prisoners were responsible for
seven additional murders").
164 See supra note 161.
165 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?
Acts, Omissions and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 704-05 (2005) (suggesting
that the death penalty may be morally required if it deters future murders and saves lives,
despite their personal moral concerns about capital punishment).
l Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1116 (2009) (statement of Stevens, J., respecting
the denial of certiorari) (citation omitted).
167 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (plurality opinion).
168 Some people may conclude that concern for human dignity and human life actually
morally requires the execution of capital murderers to protect others. Cf. Sunstein and




There remains, however, a second core objection to the
incapacitation rationale for execution that merits consideration. Many
scholars and judges reject the incapacitation rationale because they
believe that the science of predicting violence is simply too flawed to
provide a just ground for taking a human life. Unlike the objection
based on non-lethal alternatives, which too-readily assumes that non-
lethal options are morally and legally superior, this error-based
objection is rooted in empirical study. Prediction error is a formidable
concern and many critics believe that it renders the incapacitation
rationale hopelessly unjust. The following paragraphs recount some
of the scholarly objections to prediction methodology, and explain
how expanding periods of execution delay have brought prediction
errors and other problems to light.
More than three decades ago, researchers warned the Supreme
Court in Barefoot v. Estelle that dangerousness predictions in capital
cases were far more often wrong than right.169 Scholars have argued
that certain common methods of predicting dangerousness are
inherently unreliable.
Some critics have claimed, for example, that juries should never be
allowed to base their dangerousness predictions on clinical
evaluations (which derive primarily from in-person evaluations rather
than from statistics).170 One such scholar, Professor Erica Beecher-
Monas, has explained: "A decision as important as a death sentence
simply cannot be based on bunkum .... rJludicial gatekeeping to
prevent jury confusion is a minimum for fundamental fairness.
may be morally required, not for retributive reasons, but rather to prevent the taking of
innocent lives.").
169 463 U.S. 880, 920 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing research indicating .'that
psychiatrists and psychologists are accurate in no more than one out of three predictions of
violent behavior,' even among populations of individuals who are mentally ill and have
committed violence in the past" (citations omitted)).
170 Actuarial (statistical) methods of evaluation differ significantly from clinical ones. See
John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and Evidentiary
Admissibility, 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 901, 902 (2000) ("One, a formal method, uses an
equation, a formula, a graph, or an actuarial table to arrive at a probability, or expected
value, of some outcome; the other method relies on an informal, 'in the head,'
impressionistic, subjective conclusion, reached ... by a human clinical judge." (citing
William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective,
Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical-
Statistical Controversy, 2 Psychol., Pub. Pol'y, & L. 293, 294 (1996)).
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Clinical predictions of future dangerousness cannot meet these
standards. Actuarial testimony can barely squeak through."1 7 1
Other critics have condemned Supreme Court precedents allowing
juries to consider testimony by experts who have not personally
examined the defendants and who base their conclusions on
hypotheticals.17 2 Still others have attacked the Court's precedents
permitting expert testimony on the question of future dan erousness,
contending that juries are too quick to defer to "experts.'"73 Though
the Court has rejected any categorical bar on expert testimony, lower
courts in some cases have excluded expert testimony on future
dangerousness for this reason.174
These critics have focused, with rare exceptions, on the difficulty
of obtaining accurate predictions of future dangerousness at original
sentencing. They have failed to take into account the effects of
execution delay. This omission has prevented academic discourse
from shedding light on the full problem of prediction error, as well as
on a promising remedy. To appreciate this point, one must begin by
considering the dramatic expansion and scope of execution delay.
Since the Court's decisions in Furman and Gregg, the time between
171 Erica Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of Prediction: Future Dangerousness
Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 60 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 353, 415 (2003). The
reason states nonetheless allow clinical evaluations may be intuitive-for so severe a penalty
as death, one may want to have an individualized, personalized decision. Indeed, this is what
the Supreme Court mandated in Woodson v. North Carolina. See 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)
("While the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing determinations generally
reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative, we believe that in
capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment
requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process
of inflicting the penalty of death." (citation omitted)). But the problem is that clinical, in-
person evaluations are often wrong and may be less reliable than statistical evaluations.
Beecher-Monas, supra, at 415. The debate becomes one of individualized sentencing versus
accuracy.
172 See, e.g., Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 903 (discussing and rejecting the argument that
testimony on the issue of future dangerousness may not be made based on a defendant's
responses to "hypothetical questions").
1 3 See, e.g., id. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("In a capital case, the specious
testimony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the inevitable
untouchability of a medical specialist's words, equates with death itself.").
174 See, e.g., People v. Murtishaw, 631 P.2d 446, 470 (Cal. 1981) (en banc) ("One can
imagine few matters more prejudicial at the penalty trial than testimony from an established
and credentialed expert that defendant, if sentenced to life without possibility of parole,
would be likely to kill again.").
1160 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 104:1123
sentencing and execution has increased at least sixfold. Findings of
future dangerousness at capital sentencing now precede actual
execution by years and often decades. Whereas forty years ago, a
sentence of death meant execution within a few years, 7 prisoners
executed in 2017 waited on death row for more than twenty years, on
average. 176
Such delay exposes prediction errors. It reveals that some prisoners
who are sentenced to death based on findings of future dangerousness
become docile prisoners or are rehabilitated before their executions.
Future dangerousness was the initial reason for their death sentences,
but before their executions, they have ceased to be a threat. Courts
today have no means of saving their lives.
Consider the case of James Vernon Allridge. Allridge was
sentenced to death after a Texas jury found a probability that he
would continue to commit crimes. In fact, Allridge became a model
inmate. He complied with prison rules, developed skills as a writer
and artist, and-according to former guards-made his prison unit a
safer place through his calming influence.177 When Allridge was
executed at the age of forty-one, seventeen years after the jury
determined beyond a reasonable doubt that he probably would
175 David Garland has written that "[b]efore the 1960s, the average time that American
inmates spent awaiting execution was ... measured in weeks and months rather than in years
and decades." David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America's Death Penalty in an Age of
Abolition 46 (2010). Even as late as 1960, prisoners sentenced to death could expect
execution within an average of two years. See Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay
Between a Death Sentence and Execution Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29
Seton Hall L. Rev. 147, 181 (1998); see also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764-65
(2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Aarons as support for the proposition that historically
execution delays averaged about two years). Even in the years after the Court's Furman and
Gregg decisions, most prisoners were executed within a year or two of sentencing. See supra
note 246.
176 See infra Appendix III: Execution Delay in 2017. The average execution delay in 2017
was 1.45 years longer than the average execution delay in 2016, reflecting a continuing
upward trend. See infra Appendix II: Execution Delay in 2016 (showing that executions in
2016 occurred after an average delay of 18.96 years) with infra Appendix III: Execution
Delay in 2017 (showing that executions in 2017 occurred an after average delay of 20.41
years).
177 See Jordan Smith, No Mercy: The Case of James Allridge Raises Familiar Questions
About the Texas Justice System, Austin Chron. (Aug. 20, 2004), https://www.austin
chronicle.com/news/2004-08-20/no-mercy/ [https://perma.cc/8J5M-XZL8]; see also Jessica
L. Roberts, Futures Past: Institutionalizing the Re-Examination of Future Dangerousness in
Texas Prior to Execution, 11 Tex. J. C.L. & C.R. 101, 101-03 (2005) (recounting Allridge's
non-violence and rehabilitation in prison).
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commit future criminal acts of violence, the evidence profoundly
undermined that factual predicate for execution. The problem was not
hidden: news accounts publicized Allridge's appeals for clemency
based on the apparent error in the jury's prediction 78 of future
violence. 179
The more recent case of Duane Buck exposes the same problem.
Buck was sentenced to death after a Texas jury predicted his future
dangerousness. He has not committed a single disciplinary infraction
over the last twenty years on death row-a fact pointed out in media
accounts regarding his case.1 80 His model behavior in prison suggests
the jury was wrong.
The execution of prisoners based on predictions of violence that
are shown to be wrong is unjust and threatens the rule of law. Such
executions are unjust because the predicate for execution no longer
holds true. If predictions purportedly made "beyond a reasonable
doubt"1 82 and with human life on the line cannot be trusted, citizens
may conclude that the criminal justice system as a whole is unreliable
178 Here, the word "error" refers to the situation in which the fact-finder at sentencing
determined that the offender would likely commit future violence (thus meeting a
requirement for execution), but a later evaluation based on more probative accumulation of
evidence shows that he is not likely to commit future violence (and therefore does not meet
the requirement for execution). Such "error" can occur even if the person still presents some
risk of future violence, just not enough to meet the threshold required by state law for a death
sentence.
1' See, e.g., Michael Graczyk, Remorseful Store Clerk Killer Set To Die, Plainview Daily
Herald (Aug. 25, 2004), http://www.myplainview.com/news/article/Remorseful-store-clerk-
killer-set-to-die-8896435.php [https://perma.cc/4Z59-VP82]; Smith, supra note 177; Howard
Witt, Death Row Inmate Says He's Changed, Chi. Tribune (Aug. .25, 2004),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-08-25/news/0
4 082 50 253 _1 texas-defender-service-
texas-death-row-criminal-appeals [https://perma.cc/47JC-KK7F].
180 See, e.g., Errol Morris, Who Is Dangerous, and Who Dies?, N.Y. Times (June 7,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/opinion/errol-morris-interview-death-
penalty.html?mcubz=l&_r-0; see also Elizabeth Hinton, How a Racist Myth Landed Duane
Buck on Death Row, L.A. Times (Oct. 4, 2016), http://beta.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
hinton-duane-buck-future-crime-20161004-snap-story.html ("Buck has been a model
prisoner for more than two decades."); NAACP Legal Def. Fund, Duane Buck: Sentenced to
Death Because He Is Black (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.naacpldf.org/case-issue/duane-buck-
sentenced-death-because-he-black [https://perma.cc/BY5U-SSGZ] (describing Buck as "a
role model for his fellow prisoners").
181 A recent Supreme Court decision has finally given Duane Buck some hope that the
jury's original future dangerousness finding will be overturned, though not because his
model prison conduct showed the decision was wrong but because the jury's decision may
have resulted from racial bias. See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct 759, 767 (2017).
182 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071 §§ 2(b)c) (West Supp. 1980-81).
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and unfair. They may understand that some prediction error is
inevitable, but condemn the state for failing to correct it once it has
become, in the words of Justice Marshall, "unmistakably clear."l83 it
would not be unreasonable for citizens to see this omission-
however unintentional it may be-as a reflection of indifference to
the value of human life, particularly the lives of the poor and
underprivileged who end up on death row.
Not only has execution delay enabled us to witness the real
examples of apparent prediction error, but it complicates the
incapacitation argument for capital punishment for another reason:
execution delay allows such a prisoner to live for many years prior to
execution, in the very condition that the jury deemed inadequate to
contain his violence. The problem is well illustrated by the case of
Thomas Knight. Knight abducted and killed a businessman and his
wife in Florida. He was charged with first-degree murder, but
escaped from jail, and allegedly killed a shopkeeper while on the
loose.1 84 After his recapture, he went on a "rampage" in the jail
tearing up his bed and attempting "to set the mattress. . . on fire.'
Knight was finally convicted and sentenced to death, after which he
exhausted his direct appeals. Later, while on death row,1 86 he killed a
prison guard by stabbing him in the chest with a sharpened spoon.
After many more years of litigation, 8 7 he was finally executed.1 88
183 Evans v. Muncy, 498 U.S. 927, 930 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) ("The only difference between Wilbert Evans' case and that of many other capital
defendants is that the defect .. . has been made unmistakably clear for us even before his
execution is to be carried out.").
184 David Ovalle, Thomas Knight, Who Killed Miami Couple and a Prison Guard,
Executed, Miami Herald (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community
/miami-dade/articlel959035.html [https://perma.cc/S9PQ-NWBG].
185 Knight v. Dugger, 863 F.2d 705, 714 (11th Cir. 1988).
16 Knight was at the time pursuing habeas relief in the Florida courts. Id. at 706. That
made it all the more remarkable that he did not refrain from violence. See, e.g., Prieto v.
Clarke, 2013 WL 6019215, at *8 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2013), rev'd on other grounds, 780 F.3d
245 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. pet'n dismissed as moot, 136 S.Ct. 319 (2015) ("Death row
inmates have obvious incentives to behave well and take rehabilitation seriously, including
the ossibility that ... a habeas petition might be granted .... ).
Ruling on later claims, the Eleventh Circuit remarked: "To learn about the gridlock
and inefficiency of death penalty litigation, look no further than this appeal." Muhammad v.
Secretary, 733 F.3d 1065, 1066 (11th Cir. 2013).
188 Ovalle, supra note 184. Justice Breyer voted to bar his execution on the ground that
such long delay left his execution without a penological rationale. Knight v. Florida, 528
U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (arguing that "the
longer the delay, the weaker the justification for imposing the death penalty in terms of
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Knight's execution finally incapacitated him, but not before he had
an opportunity to kill again.
Execution delay thus makes a death sentence less effective as a
means of preventing future violence. The states did not face this
concern when they first incorporated future dangerousness in capital
sentencing. At that time, prisoners sentenced to death waited only a
few years before execution.189 Perversely, prisoners sentenced to
death today on grounds of future dangerousness are often
incarcerated during the years when they are most dangerous and
executed when their likelihood of future violence is diminished,
sometimes substantially.
States may attempt to reduce delay br expediting capital case
review, but that has proven difficult. 19 Absent such expedited
review, execution delay will continue to cripple the death penalty as a
mode of incapacitation and reduce the marginal incapacitative benefit
it offers over life without parole. This problem is one of degree,
however; the death penalty may still provide a protective benefit. The
problem of prediction error is different; the claim critics make is that
prediction error renders the incapacitation rationale for execution
inherently arbitrary and unjust.
The problem of prediction error is severe, but it is not intractable.
The final Part of this Article reveals that the problem of prediction
error can be dramatically reduced by reevaluating future
dangerousness during execution delays. The Article concludes with
proposals for reforms to make the use of future dangerousness in
capital sentencing substantially more consistent, fair, and defensible.
III. REHABILITATING THE INCAPACITATION RATIONALE
Contrary to the assumption of most scholars who have addressed
future dangerousness in capital sentencing, the problem of prediction
error at sentencing is not irremediable. Dangerousness assessments
can be made more accurate and fair if they are reevaluated
periodically over time. As this Article will explain, this reevaluation
punishment's basic retributive or deterrent purposes" without mentioning the incapacitation
rationale).
189 See supra note 175.
190 Alabama recently passed a bill to shorten execution delays by requiring capital




would not create an endless flood of litigation. Because
reexamination of dangerousness predictions is feasible and essential
to accuracy, it is the moral duty of legislatures to mandate such
reevaluation.
A. Reevaluating Dangerousness over Time
Under current law, future dangerousness assessments are fixed at
original sentencing. No provision exists in any capital punishment
statute that requires or even envisions the periodic reevaluation of
dangerousness over time. Thus, a jury's original prediction of
dangerousness becomes irrevocably fixed at a time many years and
often decades before the death sentence will be carried out. This
approach excludes a wealth of probative evidence gained over the
years in which a capital inmate lives a highly scrutinized life in
prison-years in which his behavior may be far more informative
than his prior conduct outside of prison or than stale statistical
estimates. Prison records may reveal his commission of disciplinary
infractions, or his abstention from them, as well as his involvement in
any potentially rehabilitative activities available to death row
prisoners (such as work, restitution, education, expressions of
remorse, or religious conversion). Such evidence would be powerful,
individualized information that could enhance the accuracy of future
dangerousness assessments.
Moreover, to the extent that capital defendants' future conduct is
predicted only based on their past conduct while outside prison, as is
the case in many jurisdictions,191 such predictions may not reflect
how defendants will function and adapt once immersed in a
regulated, supervised prison environment.'9 2 An individual's own
'9' Courts have also interpreted statutes to focus on pre-offense conduct. For example, the
Virginia Supreme Court stated in 1978 that
[i]n our view, [the future dangerousness aggravating factor] is designed to focus the
fact-finder's attention on prior criminal conduct as the principal predicate for a
prediction of future "dangerousness." If the defendant has been previously convicted
of "criminal acts of violence", i.e., serious crimes against the person committed by
intentional acts of unprovoked violence, there is a reasonable "probability", i.e., a
likelihood substantially greater than a mere possibility, that he would commit similar
crimes in the future.
Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (Va. 1978).
192 This is not necessarily true for prisoners who commit their capital offenses while in
prison. Murders committed in prison are often among those deemed sufficiently aggravated
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conduct within prison would be a much stronger predictor of his
proclivity toward violence in a prison environment.19
Some might argue that post-sentencing conduct is not revealing. A
prisoner may be held in stricter confinement, for example, as a result
of his death sentence, and thus have fewer opportunities to commit
violence. Post-sentencing prison rule compliance on death row thus
may offer only an imperfect picture of how a prisoner might behave
if taken off death row. But even death row offers opportunities for
violence if prisoners are so disposed. That is evident from cases like
that of Thomas Knight, who murdered a prison guard while on death
row in Florida.19 4 And death rows are often the scenes of violence,
sometimes sustained bouts of violent incidents.
1 9 5
to be eligible for capital punishment. See Ala. Code Ann. § 13A-5-40(a)(6) (2015); Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(a) (2017); Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(a) (2017); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 17-10-30(b)(9) (2013); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(b)(9)(A) (2016); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-
3439(3) (2008); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.025(2)(a)(5) (LexisNexis 2014); Miss. Code Ann.
§ 97-3-19(2)(b) (2014); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.032.2(9) (2016); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-
303(l)(a)(i) (2017); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 200.033(1) (LexisNexis 2012); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 630:1(I)(d) (LexisNexis 2017); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(e)(1) (2017); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2929.04(A)(4) (LexisNexis 2014); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.12(6) (West
2011); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 163.095(2)(b) (West 2017); 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 9711(d)(10) (West 2017); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-27A-1(8) (2016); Tenn. Code. Ann.
§ 39-13-204(i)(8) (2014); Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 19.03(a)(5)-(6) (West 2017); Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-202(l)(a) (LexisNexis 2017); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(3) (2014); Wash. Rev.
Code § 10.95.020(2) (2016); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-102(h)(i)(A) (2017).
193 Cf. People v. Murtishaw, 631 P.2d 446, 470 (Cal. 1981) (en banc) (barring expert
testimony on future dangerousness in the instant case but acknowledging that "a reliable
prediction is possible" in some other situations, such as "if the defendant had exhibited a
long-continued pattern of criminal violence such that any knowledgeable psychiatrist would
anticipate future violence").
194 Supra notes 184-188 and accompanying text.
195 See, e.g, Guard Attacked by Double-Murderer on California Death Row, U.S. News &
World Report (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/california/articles
/2017-04-20/guard-attacked-by-double-murderer-on-califonia-death-row ("Officials say a
guard on California's death row has been injured by a condemned inmate who previously
killed two of his fellow prisoners."); Evelyn Nieves, Rash of Violence Disrupts San
Quentin's Death Row, N.Y. Times (May 22, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/
2 00 1/05
/22/us/rash-of-violence-disrupts-san-quentin-s-death-row.html?mcubz=1 ("In the last 18
months ... a group of death row inmates have become increasingly hostile and violent.
Classified as Grade B's for their unruly behavior and gang affiliations and housed apart from
other death row prisoners in a three-story building ... these inmates have attacked guards 67
times in a year and a half. . . ."); Guards on Death Row Face Escalating Dangers, L.A.
Times (April 21, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/apr/21/news/mn-53814 [https://
perma.cc/D24W-8LXE] ("Over the last 18 months, officials say, Grade-B inmates have
committed 67 attacks .... They include one attempted stabbing, 15 kicks and five slashings
with crude prison-made knives and razors.); Lisa L. Colangelo Corky Siemaszko, Death
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Furthermore, death row prisoners sometimes find people outside of
the prison to commit violence for them. As a district judge recently
explained in upholding a future dangerousness finding in a federal
capital case: "A1 prisoner might also pose a danger if he is capable
of arranging for people outside the prison to engage in violent
activity on his behalf-a danger that would be especially present here
if, as the Government alleges, [the defendant] holds a high position in
the Bloods criminal organization."19 6 Wyoming's most recent
execution was of Mark Hopkinson, who from prison arranged the
killing of an informant against him.1 9 7 In light of the existence of
opportunities for violence even on death row, a prison record
reflecting only good behavior would be at least somewhat probative
of non-dangerousness.1 9 8
But current law does not provide for reevaluation of dangerousness
based on prison behavior. No requirement exists by statute or court
mandate that necessitates a fresh look at whether a prisoner remains
dangerous after sentencing and before execution. Consideration of
later evidence of non-dangerousness arises, if at all, only by the
happenstance of a resentencing proceeding in which a judge permits
such evidence, or, more often, as a basis for requesting clemency.
These mechanisms offer no guarantees, and no explicit legislative
provision endorses non-dangerousness as a basis for subsequent
removal of a death sentence.
Row Inmate Killed in Jail Fight, N.Y. Daily News (Sept. 8, 1999),
http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/death-row-inmate-killed-jail-fight-article-
1.856345 [https://perma.cc/5TCA-GASZ] (recounting that a prisoner on death row in New
Jersey had been "killed in a prison fight by another notorious murderer"); David
Kocieniewski, Death Row Inmate Said to Beat and Kick Another to Death in New Jersey
Prison, N.Y. Times (Sept. 8, 1999) (recounting that a death row prisoner was murdered by
another death row prisoner who "ha[d] a long history of assaulting guards and inmates").
196 United States v. Wilson, 923 F. Supp. 2d 481, 487 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Stahl,
supra note 137 ("Pelican Bay State Prison is a super-maximum penitentiary in Northern
California. And yet with all the surveillance and isolation, gangs still run thriving criminal
enterprises out on the streets-from within the fortress.").
197 See Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 89 (Wyo. 1981); see also Hopkinson Is Put to
Death, Deseret News (Jan. 22, 1992), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/205729/hopkinso
n-is-put-to-death-in-wyoming.html [https://perma.cc/4NZD-TXAB] (describing
HoPkinson's case and execution).
See Jon Sorensen & Robert D. Wrinkle, No Hope for Parole: Disciplinary Infractions
Among Death-Sentenced and Life-Without-Parole Inmates, 23 Crim. Just. & Behav. 542,
547 (1996).
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In fact, some of the states that statutorily mandate consideration of
future dangerousness in capital sentencing specify that the original
sentencing jury must decide whether the prisoner is dangerous based
only on conduct prior to and during the capital offense. This might
seem to be a reasonable restriction, because a defendant has a strong
incentive and may be able to behave well in the relatively limited
time leading up to sentencing, even if he is likely to commit future
violence later on. Far more concerning is the lack of reevaluation of
future dangerousness in light of probative, post-sentencing
behavior-including a prisoner's conduct after he has exhausted his
appeals and has only dimmed hopes for relief. Such probative
evidence might well have convinced finders of fact that death row
prisoners James Vernon Allridge and Duane Buck no longer
presented the dangers that Texas juries originally thought supported
their executions-had finders of fact been asked to evaluate that later
evidence.199 The lack of attention to post-sentencing evidence has
lethal effects.
How could subsequent, post-sentencing conduct be taken into
account? Commentators have proposed procedures. In 2004, the
Texas Defender Service suggested that a hearing could be required
"immediately preceding an inmate's execution in which the accuracy
of the jury's prediction in that particular case could be evaluated."2 0
In a 2005 article, Professor Jessica Roberts presented a similar
proposal for future dangerousness to be reviewed "on the eve of
execution."20 1 Specifically designed for Texas, Roberts constructed
her proposal to "keepri the Texas capital sentencing structure intact
(in order to preserve the crucial participation of the jury)" but task the
Board of Pardons and Parole with reevaluating future dangerousness
just prior to execution, with the prisoner bearing the burden to
disprove dangerousness. 20 2
Though it would reduce the risk of error, this approach has several
major flaws. One problem is a practical one: allowing a prisoner to
199 This is not to suggest that a finder of fact necessarily would have found, in light of
post-sentencing evidence, that these prisoners were no longer likely to commit future
violence.
200 Tex. Defender Serv., supra note 16.
201 Roberts, supra note 177, at 133.
202 Id. at 131-35. Roberts seems to think that legislative action would not be needed. See
id. at 135. In this regard, her proposal could raise serious democratic legitimacy concerns,
and might violate the separation of powers. See infra Part III at page 1168-69.
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present a future dangerousness challenge on the eve of execution
could "unleash an endless stream of litigation," as the state of
Virginia argued in response to a prisoner's plea for judicial
reevaluation. 03 Even Justice Marshall admitted that "rit may indeed
be the case that a State cannot realistically accommodate
postsentencing evidence casting doubt on a jury's finding of future
dangerousness."2 04 The concern is well-founded. Constitutional due
process would entitle a death-sentenced prisoner to appellate review
of a denial of relief.2 0 5 Though such a system might seem similar to
appeals from the denial of parole in non-capital cases, which are
routine and do not engender endless litigation, the situation is
different when a scheduled execution is at stake. Review on the "eve
of execution" would create logistical problems for a state planning an
execution that are not implicated for appeals raised by prisoners in
long-term custody. Furthermore, capital case decisions receive
special scrutiny to ensure "heightened reliability." 2 0 6 These two
features would make reevaluation on the eve of execution extremely
costly and a major threat to the finality of death sentences. It is very
unlikely that such a reform would be politically feasible in any
capital punishment jurisdiction.
Perhaps, statutory action would not be needed for this reform.
Roberts, in fact, suggested that the Texas Board of Pardons and
Parole could begin to reevaluate future dangerousness on its own.
This suggestion raises two concerns, however. First, it could be
impracticable: parole board members would be reluctant to invite
costly and potentially "endless" litigation without legislative
approval; such a move might be political suicide. Second, any
203 Evans v. Muncy, 498 U.S. 927, 929-30 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from the denial
of certiorari) (describing Virginia's argument against review of a future dangerousness
finding based on post-sentencing prison behavior).
204 Id. at 312. To Justice Marshall, the moral conclusion was clear: "[I]f it is impossible to
construct a system capable of accommodating all evidence relevant to a man's entitlement to
be spared death-no matter when that evidence is disclosed-then it is the system, not the
life of the man sentenced to death, that should be dispatched." Id.
205 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974) (requiring "minimum procedures ... to
insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated"). For parole hearings, which
likewise consider future dangerousness, due process requires limited judicial review. See,
e.g., In re Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d 174, 205 (Cal. 2002) ("[T]he judicial branch is authorized to
review the factual basis of a decision of the Board denying parole in order to ensure that the
decision comports with the requirements of due process of law. . . .").
206 United States v. Davis, 912 F. Supp. 938, 948 (E.D. La. 1996).
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decision to override decisions by a citizen jury should be
democratically legitimate; legislative decisions would be more
legitimate and directly representative of the people's priorities than
decisions by parole boards comprised of appointed executive
officials.
One other scholar, Meghan Shapiro, has proposed a way to
reevaluate future dangerousness in light of post-sentencing evidence.
Shapiro has argued that the little-known writ of audita querela should
be used for that purpose.207 Her proposal has serious flaws, however.
Originally adopted to allow a civil judgment to be challenged based
on a "matter arising subsequent o entry of judgment,",2 08 today "[t]he
writ [of audita querela] is generally moribund and it is unlikely
that audita querala [sic1 will have any post-conviction application."2
No court has allowed such a writ to be used to challenge a finding of
future dangerousness in capital sentencing. Indeed, state courts
dismissed a petition for the writ of audita querela filed years earlier
by Shapiro's father on behalf of death row prisoner Wilbert Evans,
who claimed that his role in quelling a prison riot showed he was no
longer dangerous.2 10 The writ would not provide a consistent and
adequate vehicle for review.2 11
Shapiro's approach also would raise democratic legitimacy and
separation-of-powers concerns. In the absence of a statutory or
constitutional right to review, courts would be "loathe to overturn" a
sentence that "has been lawfully imposed," as the Fourth Circuit
remarked when denying Evans's request for reevaluation.212 Its
207 Shapiro, supra note 17, at 184.
208 James Win. Moore & Elizabeth B.A. Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 55
Yale L.J. 623, 666-67 (1946).
209 Peter Hack, The Roads Less Traveled: Post Conviction Relief Alternatives and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 30 Am. J. Crim. L. 171, 220 (2003); see also
Shin v. United States, No. CR 04-00150 SOM, 2017 WL 2802866, at *22 (D. Haw. June 28,
2017) (stating that a writ of audita querela may not be considered unless "new evidence is
discovered and other remedies are unavailable" and that such conditions are necessary but
not sufficient to grant the writ); United States v. Chandler, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1162 (N.D.
Ala. 2016) ("The courts of appeals have expressed varying levels of skepticism about
whether audita querela is available at all in criminal proceedings . . . .").
210 Evans v. Muncy, 916 F.2d 163, 165 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
211 Cf. Chandler, 183 F. Supp. 3d at 1161 (observing that "the only consistency in [the
writs'] application was that they applied at the whimsy of the presiding judge"); Klapprott v.
United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614 (1949) ("[F]ew courts ever have agreed as to what
circumstances would justify relief under these old remedies.").
212 Evans, 916 F.2d at 167.
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decision emphasized that a federal court should not "freely substitute
rits] own judgment for that of sentencing juries or state executives"
and "thereby throw into question every capital conviction resting on
the aggravating circumstance of future dangerousness."2 13 Concern
for democratic legitimacy, federalism, and the separation of powers
make the writ of audita querela a problematic remedy on normative
as well as practical grounds.
A far better avenue exists that no scholar has proposed so far:
periodic reevaluation of future dangerousness, enacted as a statutory
mandate. This approach would reduce more significantly and
consistently the risk of error, while commanding democratic
legitimacy. State law should prescribe when reevaluation must occur.
A sensible interval would be short enough to allow for at least one
reevaluation before execution but long enough to offer probative
evidence of prison behavior. Five years could be a ood choice,
because virtually no execution occurs before that time.
Periodic review would focus on the offender's prison disciplinary
records and any other relevant evidence. A prisoner might offer
actuarial data suggesting that his older age has made him a lesser
threat, for example.215 The proceeding could entail lay testimony, and
expert testimony, provided it were deemed sufficiently reliable.216
213 Id.
214 The shortest period between sentencing and execution for any prisoner in 2017 was
eight years, Execution List 2017, Death Penalty Info. Ctr.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2017 [https://perma.cc/6BHV-YP2T] (last visited
May 28, 2018); in 2016, it was seven, Execution List 2016, Death Penalty Info. Ctr.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2016 [https://perma.cc/9KPU-GYDS]. See infra
Appendix III: Execution Delay in 2017 and infra Appendix II: Execution Delay in 2016.
Even in the case of death penalty "volunteers," who waive their appeals, executions tend to
be long delayed. "Volunteer" Steven Spears spent nine years on death row before his recent
execution. See Information on Defendants Who Were Executed Since 1976 and Designated
as "Volunteers," Death Penalty Info. Ctr., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/information-
defendants-who-were-executed-1976-and-designated-volunteers [https://perma.cc/PA5G-
R87V] (last visited May 28, 2018); see also Execution List 2016, Death Penalty Info. Ctr.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2016 [https://perma.cc/X3HU-R9DC] (last visited
Map 28, 2018) (showing that Steven Spears spent nine years on death row).
See, e.g., Alec Buchanan et al., Resource Document on Psychiatric Violence Risk
Assessment, Am. J. Psychiatry Data Supp. 3 (Mar. 2012), https://www.psychiatry.org/File
%20Library/Psychiatrists/Directories/Library-and-Archive/resource-documents/rd2011
violencerisk.pdf [https://perma.cc/B62L-GT84] (asserting that "crimes of violence are more
often committed by younger males").
216 The Supreme Court has declined to place any categorical ban on lay or expert
testimony. The future dangerousness decision upheld by the Court in Jurek v. Texas was
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Deference should not be granted to the original determination of
future dangerousness at sentencing, because that would hinder
accuracy. The burden of proof and standard of proof should mirror
those used at original sentencing. If the state could not demonstrate a
probability of future violence, then the prisoner's sentence should be
reduced to life in prison.217
A prisoner found to remain a future threat would have a right to
limited judicial review of that determination under due process
218 aviprecedents. To avoid adding to existing execution delays, a state
could require a prisoner to appeal an adverse determination within a
short period of time, perhaps ninety days, and could schedule his
execution for a year or two later, leaving ample time for judicial
review.
Those steps would offer a reasonable and practical process for
reevaluating future dangerousness. But an equally important question
remains: Who should decide whether future dangerousness remains?
Must a new jury be convened? This question can be answered best by
considering first the nature of the dangerousness decision. The
purpose of the inquiry is to make an empirical determination: an
accurate prediction. It is true that predictions of dangerousness can be
wrong, but the potential for error confirms that they also can be right.
That a prediction of future violence is difficult to make with perfect
accuracy does not change its character as an empirical determination.
Future dangerousness is a question that requires consideration of
based entirely on lay testimony, see 428 U.S. 262, 267 (1976), and the Court has permitted
determinations of future dangerousness to be based on expert testimony, see Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 897-98 (1983). State and federal court and parole authorities,
however, should scrutinize proposed evidence and screen out potentially unreliable sources.
See Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 10-11
(2003) (urging "caution when making predictions of anti-social behavior" and arguing that
"[ojnly the best prediction methods should be used").
2 7 States that do not offer life with the possibility of release for capital murders should
resentence such a prisoner to life without parole. States might choose to make life without
parole the only alternative, rather than allowing the possibility of release, for retributive
reasons. They also might do so for incapacitation reasons, concluding that even if a prisoner
is no longer a future danger when confined, he may commit violence if released.
Importantly, such prisoners determined no longer to present a threat of future violence in
prison would not need to be subjected to prolonged solitary confinement to protect others.
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
218 See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). Review may be more




facts-such as prior crimes, characteristics that correspond to higher
rates of violence, and statements of a desire to kill again. The correct
answer reflects statistical probabilities, not moral values. That
explains why the Supreme Court has remarked that certain facts, such
as an offender's "inability to learn from his mistakes" due to a mental
defect "suggest a 'yes' answer to the question of future
dangerousness .
Statutes regarding future dangerousness are often problematically
vague, but this too does not change the empirical or factual nature of
the dangerousness question. Most statutes that make future
dangerousness part of capital sentencing ask whether there is "a
probability" that the defendant would commit future violence. This
violence must endanger "society." Both of these terms have left
ambiguities for courts and juries to resolve. One scholar has
described future dangerousness as only a "partially empirical"
determination because of that ambiguity.2 But such ambiguity is not
inherent in the future dangerousness inquiry. The law may-and
should-state clearly what risk of harm is sufficient to justify a
finding of future dangerousness. That way the question will be
purely, not partially, empirical, and will invite only one correct
answer.
The future dangerousness determination contrasts with decisions
that are moral or normative in nature. Such decisions do not admit of
demonstrably correct answers, but instead turn on judgments about
the relative value of various goods. The jury's determination about
whether a capital defendant should be granted leniency, for example,
is a quintessentially moral or normative decision. It involves
questions regarding which purposes of punishment to prioritize, and
whether mercy should play a role in sentencing. It requires jurors to
consider questions such as whether abuse that a defendant suffered as
a child warrants leniency even if that evidence does not explain the
219 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323 (1989).
220 Brian Sites, Comment, The Dangers of Future Dangerousness in Death Penalty Use, 34
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 959, 961 (2007) ("Using risk assessments . . . , juries decide the larger,
normative aspect of a future dangerousness decision: how much risk is sufficient to conclude
that the defendant will be a future danger to society? In other words, if a risk assessment
expert testifies that there is a 52% chance that a defendant will commit a crime in the future,
the jury must decide if that chance is 'enough' under the applicable law.").
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defendant's crime or mitigate his culpability.2 2 1 The "individualized
assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty is a moral
inquiry." 222 The answer chosen is legitimate not because it is correct,
but because it "express[esl the conscience of the community."2 2 3
In a democracy, moral decisions that admit of no demonstrably
right answer are legitimate if they embody the collective judgment of
the community. Those judgments may be expressed through the
criminal laws, enacted by legislators held accountable to the people
through elections.2 2 4 They also may be expressed through the
judgments of a jury. The role of the jury in representing moral norms
is its most essential function.
The jury's role as an empirical fact-finder is less important. To be
sure, the jury has served a historical function of resolving questions
of fact at trial, a traditional role embodied in the Sixth Amendment
and Article III of the Constitution. But that role arose at a time when
the jury was drawn from a usually close-knit community and was
familiar with the facts of the crime; it was the most informed
decisionmaker. Today, jury members do not have personal
knowledge of the charged crimes; indeed, those who do will be struck
for cause. Furthermore, the fact-finding role of the jury, while
protected by the Constitution, has been greatly undermined by the
widespread practice of plea bargaining. In this context, it would be
strange to insist that the jury must make the new reevaluation
determination under this newly proposed procedure.
It is much more important for the jury to retain its role in deciding
whether a death sentence is morally deserved, a determination that
virtually all capital punishment jurisdictions require to be imposed
not only by a jury, but by a unanimous jury vote. 225 The moral
221 The Court has stated that a defendant has a right to present "mitigating" evidence that
does not explain or excuse the crime committed. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
110 (1982). At the same time, trial courts have no constitutional obligation to advise the jury
that it may exercise "mercy." Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 371-72 (1993).
222 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
223 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
224 See Penry, 492 U.S. at 331 ("The clearest and most reliable objective evidence of
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures.").
225 All capital punishment jurisdictions but Alabama require that decision not only to be
made by a jury, but to be made by a unanimous one. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Florida
Legislature Passes Bill Eliminating Non-Unanimous Jury Recommendations for Death
Penalty, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6702 [https://perma.cc/HAW6-4V5R] (last visited
Mar. 10, 2018).
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judgment as to life or death must be democratic, and it requires a
demonstrable social consensus as to what is morally appropriate.2 26
Empirical reevaluation of future dangerousness, in contrast, need
not and should not turn on questions of moral desert.22 7 A parole
board, judge, or commission would be just as capable of reaching a
correct answer based on factual evaluations.2 2 8 This means that states
have several avenues to provide for reevaluation of dangerousness,
making reform more feasible and perhaps more likely to be
empirically correct.
This may lead some to wonder whether dangerousness predictions
ever must be made by a jury-even at original sentencing. Until
relatively recently, the Supreme Court "never suggested that jury
sentencing is constitutionally required" in capital cases.229 To the
contrary, the Court recognized that "judicial sentencing should lead,
if anything, to even greater consistency ... since a trial judge is more
experienced in sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able to
impose sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases."230
The Supreme Court later reversed course, holding in Apprendi v. New
Jersey that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
226 One might ask why we ever allow judges to impose sentences that reflect moral (as
opposed to empirical) judgment. In an ideal world, the jury would determine all normative
questions, while empirical ones could and perhaps should be made by a judge (such as what
restrictions are needed for specific deterrence or incapacitation of an offender). It may be
too difficult to involve juries in sentencing non-capital cases, however-though some
jurisdictions have tried, and several scholars have so urged. See, e.g., Nancy J. King, How
Different Is Death-Jury Sentencing in Capital and Non-Capital Cases Compared, 2 Ohio St.
J. Crim. L. 195, 214 (2004); Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 Duke L.J.
951, 954-56 (2003). To the extent that moral choices can be cordoned off from empirical
ones, and feasibly made by juries, they ought to be so determined in all cases. For purposes
of this Article, however, it is only essential to explain why the core determination of desert
implicit in capital sentencing should be made by the jury, but the empirical prediction of
danerousness may be made by an 
expert body.
States may require the future dangerousness decision to be unanimous in order to avoid
error in favor of death, a separate goal from the measurement of normative consensus.
228 Perhaps one might want to ensure that any errors are committed in a manner that is
maximally democratically legitimate, so that society as a whole might share in the blame.
This would suggest hat reevaluation should be done by a jury, assuming that there is still a
possibility of predictive error.
229 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976); see also Clemons v. Mississippi, 494
U.S. 738, 746 (1990) (reiterating that "neither the Sixth Amendment, nor the Eighth
Amendment, nor any other constitutional provision provides a defendant with the right to
have a jury determine the appropriateness of a capital sentence").
230 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252. Judges also might be less inclined to overvalue the testimony
of experts, when it comes to claims regarding the risk of future violence.
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prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."23 1 It went on to apply this rule to
capital-case aggravating factors in Ring v. Arizona,232 constitut -
ionalizing the jury's role in the initial sentencing decision.
A jury might not be constitutionally obligatory, however, if the
future dangerousness question were addressed in a different way. If
capital punishment jurisdictions made clear that future dangerousness
may not serve as the sole aggravating factor that elevates first-degree
murder into a capital crime,23 3 but instead that a lack of future
dangerousness is a reason to withhold an otherwise deserved death
penalty, existing precedent might not require that decision to be made
by a jury. Already under current law, for example, the death penalty is
prohibited if a court determines that an offender is incompetent, whether
that determination is made at the time of original sentencing, or on the
eve of execution. 234 Judges, not juries, also decide whether a person
has become insane prior to execution and therefore may not be
executed.2 35 Those decisions, which neither elevate the penalty nor
pertain to the question of desert, do not require a jury determination.
Neither should the decision to withhold an otherwise deserved death
penalty because a defendant does not present a future threat.
Nor would a jury be needed for the sake of democratic legitimacy.
Death sentences would still reflect the will of the people because the
jury would have decided that death was deserved. Life sentences too
would reflect a democratic decision-either the jury's conclusion that
231 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
232 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, believing, on the
one hand, that Furman imposed an illegitimate burden on the states to narrow the death
penalty, but agreeing, on the other hand, that a fact increasing punishment must be found by
a jury. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
233 Death penalty statutes in most states and all federal jurisdictions require additional
aggravation besides future dangerousness, before the death penalty may be imposed. Some
states, like Texas, Oregon, and Virginia, build additional aggravation into the definition of
capital offenses. See supra notes 41, 65 & 67. Other jurisdictions, including federal ones,
require statutory aggravation and treat future dangerousness only as a non-statutory
aggravating factor. See supra notes 79-80. Only the laws of Idaho, Oklahoma, and Wyoming
permit future dangerousness to serve as the sole aggravating factor that makes first-degree
murder subject to the death penalty. See supra note 64.
234 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 934 (2007) (holding that "[p]rior findings of
competency do not foreclose a prisoner from proving he is incompetent to be executed
because of his present mental condition" and permitting a prisoner to raise a new
competency challenge after his execution date had been set).
235 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986).
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the offender did not deserve execution, or the legislature's decision
that the offender could be safely punished by non-lethal means.
Either conclusion would reflect a deliberate and democratic choice.
Even if courts insist that juries decide any future dangerousness issue
at original sentencing, they have no reason to require a jury for post-
sentencing reevaluation of future dangerousness. The fact that a jury
would not be needed is important, because it would make the
reevaluation process more efficient and feasible, without reducing its
benefits. Such reevaluation would correct many prediction errors that
could undermine public faith in the criminal justice system. It would
signal the state's commitment to preserving human life where that
can be done without risking others. It also would give death-
sentenced prisoners an extraordinary incentive to behave and learn
non-violent approaches to the conflicts and stresses of prison life.
Review can only remedy errors in one direction, it must be noted.
The Court's understanding of the Double Jeopardy and Due Process
Clauses prevents any correction of false negatives in jury sentencing
(as when the jury declines to find a defendant dangerous, and he goes
on to commit violence).236 If a death-sentenced prisoner is found no
longer to present a sufficient risk of future violence and his death
sentence is lifted, the state may be barred from executing him even if
he reverts to violence. That is not entirely settled, and perhaps the
problem could be avoided if a state were merely to suspend, rather
than commute, the death sentence of a person found no longer
dangerous. The state could continue periodically reevaluating him for
dangerousness to determine whether suspension of his death sentence
remains appropriate.237 But that is a constitutionally dubious propos-
236 The American Law Institute's recently approved draft of the Model Penal Code
sentencing provisions allows only for reductions in long sentences, likely based on these
same Double Jeopardy and Due Process concerns. See The American Law Institute, Model
Penal Code: Sentencing, Proposed Final Draft § 305.6(5) (approved May 2017),
http://robinainstitute.umn.edu/publications/model-penal-code-sentencing-proposed-final-
draft-approved-may-2017 [https://perma.cc/RW98-A95E].
237 An analogous question arises in the context of a capital prisoner who becomes
incompetent prior to execution. The Supreme Court's decision in Panetti v. Quarterman bars
the execution of any prisoner who is incompetent, regardless of whether he was competent
during his offense, trial, and sentencing. 551 U.S. 930, 934-35 (2007). Therefore, courts
must review claims of incompetency prior to execution, without regard to whether the claims
were raised in prior filings in state or federal court. Id. at 945. But that does not mean that a
single finding of incompetency requires immediate vacatur of a death sentence. Federal
Judge Priscilla Owen has explained: "[A] determination that a defendant [has become]
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ition, and one that surely would invite litigation. 238 But that is a con-
stitutionally dubious proposition, and one that surely would invite
litigation.
incompetent to be executed would not vacate the sentence of death. The sentence would
remain, but, as a constitutional matter, it could not be enforced unless and until the defendant
became competent to be executed." Green v. Thaler, 699 F.3d 404, 421 (5th Cir. 2012)
(Owen, J., concurring).
Similarly, capital punishment jurisdictions that predicate death sentences on future
dangerousness could treat a finding that a capital prisoner no longer presents a future threat
as a reason to suspend, but not to vacate, his death sentence. That approach would avoid
locking into place a life sentence for a capital prisoner who behaves well for a time, but who,
after additional years, could again become a threat. (The Ex Post Facto Clause might prohibit
resentencing a prisoner to death based on the same offense that led to his original death
sentence.)
Alternatively, a capital punishment jurisdiction could avoid the risk of error in favor of life
by vacating a death sentence only after two or perhaps three temporally dispersed findings
that a prisoner no longer presents a future threat. If a defendant no longer is a future danger,
there is much less reason to keep him confined on death row. Whether his death sentence is
suspended or vacated, a non-dangerous prisoner could be released into the general prison
population. Taking this approach would present a more humane course than entirely ignoring
a first finding that a prisoner no longer presents a future threat.
238 An analogous question arises in the context of a capital prisoner who becomes
incompetent prior to execution. The Supreme Court's decision in Panetti v. Quarterman bars
the execution of any prisoner who is incompetent, regardless of whether he was competent
during his offense, trial, and sentencing. 551 U.S. 930, 934-35 (2007). Therefore, courts
must review claims of incompetency prior to execution, without regard to whether the claims
were raised in prior filings in state or federal court. Id. at 945. But that does not mean that a
single finding of incompetency requires immediate vacatur of a death sentence. Federal
Judge Priscilla Owen has explained: "[A] determination that a defendant [has become]
incompetent to be executed would not vacate the sentence of death. The sentence would
remain, but, as a constitutional matter, it could not be enforced unless and until the defendant
became competent to be executed." Green v. Thaler, 699 F.3d 404, 421 (5th Cir. 2012)
(Owen, J., concurring).
Similarly, capital punishment jurisdictions that predicate death sentences on future
dangerousness could treat a finding that a capital prisoner no longer presents a future threat
as a reason to suspend, but not to vacate, his death sentence. That approach would avoid
locking into place a life sentence for a capital prisoner who behaves well for a time, but who,
after additional years, could again become a threat. (The Ex Post Facto Clause might prohibit
resentencing a prisoner to death based on the same offense that led to his original death
sentence.)
Alternatively, a capital punishment jurisdiction could avoid the risk of error in favor of life
by vacating a death sentence only after two or perhaps three temporally dispersed findings
that a prisoner no longer presents a future threat. If a defendant no longer is a future danger,
there is much less reason to keep him confined on death row. Whether his death sentence is
suspended or vacated, a non-dangerous prisoner could be released into the general prison
population. Taking this approach would present a more humane course than entirely ignoring
a first finding that a prisoner no longer presents a future threat.
Virginia Law Review
Drafters of a statutory amendment requiring reevaluation of future
dangerousness could take inspiration from provisions of law that
already require reevaluation of dangerousness in contexts such as
parole and civil commitment. A person subjected to civil
commitment in the federal system, for example, is routinely
reevaluated and is entitled to "annual reports concerning rhis] mental
condition . .. and containing recommendations concerning the need
for his continued commitment."2 3 9
Legislatures have at least two reasons to enact such a reevaluation
reform. The first is for the sake of fairness and justice. Death
sentences predicated on future dangerousness may become
indefensible if a prisoner turns out to be a model inmate and no
longer poses a threat. Furthermore, the courts may be more likely to
bar an execution if the original reason for it (such as the need for
incapacitation) no longer applies. Justice Marshall was prepared to
grant relief in the case of Wilbert Evans, for example, on the ground
that he "face[d] an imminent execution that even the [statel
appearred] to concede [wa] s indefensible in light of the undisputed
facts proffered by Evans."2 0 States might decide to avoid the risk of
having such executions deemed unconstitutional by providing a
mechanism for periodic review. A state interested in promoting
justice and avoiding court interference would have at least two
reasons to enact this critical reform.
Some may still doubt that legislatures in capital punishment states
will entertain such reforms, given that the reforms could make the
death penalty even more costly and procedurally complex.2 41 That
view is unproductive and overly pessimistic. States routinely provide
for post-conviction relief in capital cases, though such relief is not
constitutionally required,24 2 and have taken other steps to increase
fairness. Many require the appointment of two experienced defense
attorneys for a capital defendant,24 3 even though the Supreme Court
has required only one. Some may provide these safeguards to guard
239 18 U.S.C. § 4247(e)(1)(B) (2012).
240 Evans v. Muncy, 498 U.S. 927, 927 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
241 See also Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
denial of certiorari) (blaming the Court for "arm[ing] capital defendants with an arsenal of
'constitutional' claims with which they may delay their executions").
242 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1987).
243 See, e.g., Ark. Admin. Code § 160.00.2 (2017); Ohio Admin. Code § 120-1-10 (2017).
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against judicial interference,244 but it is plausible to think that states,
like most of the American public, actually care that their capital
punishment systems be just, fair, and constitutional. And even if they
were to enact reforms solely to avoid judicial rebuke, those reforms
would still be valuable.
It is true that legislatures have thus far failed to require such
reevaluation to date. But this may reflect ignorance and inertia in the
face of changed conditions rather than any kind of conscious or
callous disregard of the problem of prediction error. The decades of
execution delay seen frequently today, and which have exposed
prediction errors, were unheard of when legislatures made future
dangerousness an explicit part of capital sentencing. In the decade
before Furman, executions occurred a year or two after sentencing,
and even most of the executions that took place in the half-decade
following Gregg occurred within one or two years of sentencing.
2 46
244 States that create avenues for state post-conviction relief expose themselves to an
additional layer of federal review with regard to federal claims, because the Supreme Court
has discretion to review the decision of the highest state court rejecting such relief. See, e.g.,
Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1742-43, 1745-46 (2016) (reversing the Georgia
Supreme Court's decision regarding a state habeas petition). In such appeals, the Court is not
bound by the deferential standard of review prescribed by Congress for federal habeas cases.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (2012). This presents real costs for the states; Justice Alito recently
noted that the Supreme Court lately has "evidenced a predilection for granting review of
state-court decisions denying postconviction relief." Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1761. States have,
however, a competing incentive to create habeas procedures in order to limit federal review.
See Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional Claims
Raised by State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U.
Chi. Legal F. 315, 319.
245 See Aarons, supra note 175, at 181.
246 Gary Gilmore's execution in 1977 took place three months and ten days after his death
sentence was imposed; Jesse Bishop's execution in 1979 was conducted one year, eight
months, and twelve days after his sentence; and Steven Timothy Judy's execution in 1981
occurred one year and twelve days after his sentence. John Spenkelink's execution in 1979
followed five years, five months, and five days after his sentence, but less than three years
after the Supreme Court reapproved the death penalty in Gregg. See infra Appendix 1:
Execution Delay 1976-1983. All states that now require the consideration of future
dangerousness codified that requirement by 1989. Delay between sentencing and execution
in 1984 was, on average, only about six years, and in 1989 it was still less than eight years.
Tracy L. Snell, Capital Punishment, 2013 - Statistical Tables, U.S. Dep't of Justice 12, 14
tbl.10 (2014). And, notably, when Wyoming became the final state to make future
dangerousness a statutory aggravating factor in 1989, it simultaneously sought to ensure a
speedier process by providing for "automatic review" in the state supreme court and ordering
that "[s]uch review by the supreme court shall have priority over all other cases." Act of
Mar. 6, 1989, ch. 171, § 1, 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws 295 (amending Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-103(a)).
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The enormous delay between sentencing and execution that today is a
fixture of death penalty procedure was beyond the horizon and
beyond the pale when future dangerousness was enacted into death
penalty laws in America. The states' failure to address prediction
error in the past does not mean they would disregard it in the future,
once made aware of its consequences and the possibility of correcting
it during execution delays.
Now is an ideal time to invite legislatures to consider sentencing
reevaluation proposals. Legislatures have become increasingly aware
of the occurrence and problem of execution delay. Alabama recently
enacted a law designed to speed up appellate and post-conviction
review in capital cases.24 7 The California Supreme Court approved a
similar law passed as a ballot proposition. It is now an opportune
moment, as legislatures and the public are increasingly focused on
execution delay, to further highlight how execution delay presents an
opportunity for meaningful reform.
Periodic future dangerousness review in capital cases would fit
within a larger movement today toward "second look" resentencing.
The movement has garnered prominent allies; Justice Anthony
Kennedy joined an ABA Roundtable on "Second Look" Sentencing
Reforms in 2009.249 In May 2017, members of the American Law
Institute voted to approve reforms to the Model Penal Code's
247 Alabama Fair Justice Act, 2017 Ala. Laws Act 2017-417 (S.B. 187) (signed into law
on May 26, 2017), http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/alison/searchableinstruments/2017
RS/bills/SB187.htm [https://perma.cc/XVE3-9ULZ] (requiring prisoners to seek appellate
and ost-conviction review at the same time).
24 Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act, Proposition 66, 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. A-150
(West) (approved by voter referendum in November 2016). Notably, the California Supreme
Court approved the constitutionality of the voter proposition but took the teeth out of its
provisions designed to speed up executions. See Briggs v. Brown, 400 P.3d 29, 34 (Cal.
2017), as modified on denial of reh'g (Oct. 25, 2017) ("Petitioner's constitutional challenges
do not warrant relief. However, we hold that in order to avoid serious separation of powers
problems, provisions of Proposition 66 that appear to impose strict deadlines on the
resolution of judicial proceedings must be deemed directive rather than mandatory."). Other
states have sought to speed up capital case review, as well. Colorado has required
streamlined habeas and appellate processes, with a two-year limit on all review. See John
Ingold, Colorado Law to Speed Up Death Penalty Is Failing, Advocates on Both Sides Say,
Denver Post (July 25, 2016) http://www.denverpost.com/2016/07/25/colorado-death-
penalty-law-failing/ [https://perma.cc/TBB9-ZKV5]. The Colorado Supreme Court has
created an exception to the two-year limit, however, again prolonging litigation. See id.
249 See Margaret Colgate Love, Sentence Reduction Mechanisms in a Determinate
Sentencing System: Report of the Second Look Roundtable, 21 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 211, 218
(2009).
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("MPC") sentencing provisions.250 The revisions would encourage
courts to reevaluate and reduce long-term sentences. Though they
apply only to prison sentencing, and not death sentences, the
"principles" they articulate support a similar kind of review for death
sentences. The proposed revisions include:
* Sentence reevaluation once any prisoner has served 15
years of a long-term prison sentence;251
* Subsequent reevaluation of the prisoner's sentence at
252
least every 10 years;
* Notification to prisoners of their reevaluation
opportunities;253
* State-funded counsel for prisoners in the reevaluation
254
process;
* Reevaluation in light of present circumstances and
punishment goalS25 5 (including rehabilitation and
"incapacitation of dangerous offenders"256); and
* A mechanism for limited review of resentencing
decisions.257
Notably, these measures are designed to allow for reevaluation
without protracted litigation if a prisoner does not receive a lower
sentence after a second-look review. The draft states that, "rt]here
shall be a mechanism for review of decisions under this provision,
which may be discretionary rather than mandatory."2 5 8 Limits on
review might similarly be introduced to reevaluation in capital cases.
Admittedly, there would be costs associated with this approach.
Death row prisoners will use every opportunity to try to save or
250 The Am. Law Inst., Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Proposed Final Draft (approved
May 2017), http://robinainstitute.umn.edu/publications/model-penal-code-sentencing-
proposed-final-draft-approved-may-2017 [https://perma.cc/RW98-A95E].
2 I d. § 305.6(1).
252 Id. § 305.6(2).
253 Id. § 305.6(3).
254 Id.
255 Id. § 305.6(4).
256 Id. § 1.02(a)(ii).
257 Id. § 305.6(8).
258 Id. (emphasis added).
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extend their lives. The price may be worth paying, however, to avoid
unjust executions and to preserve public faith in the criminal process.
Other objections to reevaluation more broadly include the concern,
voiced most powerfully by Professor Meghan Ryan, that reevaluation
of sentencing decisions necessarily harms and overrides
democratically legitimate choices.2 5 9 Ryan's criticism is a powerful
one, but the same objection cannot be made to undermine the
proposal in this Article. Death sentences predicated on grounds other
than future dangerousness would not be subjected to review. The
reevaluation process proposed for future dangerousness-based
sentences would not permit a redetermination of desert. It would
review only the empirical assessment of future risk. This is in
keeping with what Professor John Monahan has recognized to be a
larger "resurgence of interest in risk assessment in criminal
sentencing."2 Thus, the reform proposed in this Article reflects
many of the laudable principles articulated in the MPC revisions,
without mirroring what is arguably their greatest normative flaw.
Some may wonder why prediction error cannot be corrected
through the normal process of executive clemency. At least two
compelling arguments can be made against that approach. The first
goes to the adequacy of the clemency process. Clemency petitions
already often include pleas for leniency based on the good conduct of
prisoners on death row, but they are rarely granted on this ground.2 61
Relying on gubernatorial mercy would leave what should be a
consistent and mandatory practice designed to prevent unjustified
executions to the mercy of discretionary politics. Governors could
face strong pressures from victims' families, capital punishment
advocates, and law enforcement entities not to commute sentences.2 6 2
These pressures could lead governors to exercise clemency only
rarely and inconsistently. That is precisely how clemency is exercised
today.
259 Meghan J. Ryan, Taking Another Look at Second-Look Sentencing, 81 Brook. L. Rev.
149, 151-52 (2015).
260 Monahan, supra note 21, at 2.
261 See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 182-83 (describing clemency as an insufficient remedy
for erroneous future dangerousness predictions). No state has protocol that makes non-
dangerousness a presumptive basis for clemency. Id. at 182 n. 196 and accompanying text.
The inconsistency and inadequacy of clemency likely explains why the proposed
drafters of the revised MPC advocated statutory reforms to ensure meaningful and consistent
reevaluation of long-term sentences.
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A second argument against relying on executive clemency lies in
concern for the rule of law. Any reduction of a death sentence would
unsettle expectations of the victim's family and the community. It
would seem that the just outcome, approved by the jury as the
representative and conscience of the community, had been overridden
by new-and not necessarily legitimate-considerations. This would
produce uncertainty and distrust of the judicial system. A legal
decision to require periodic reevaluation of future dangerousness
would mitigate these concerns in three ways. First, it would provide
the community with ex ante notice that prisoners no longer found to
present future dangers will not be executed. Second, it would make
reevaluation mandatory and consistent for all death sentences based
on incapacitation. Third, it would offer a greater foundation in
democratic choice and democratic legitimacy than would a decision
by the executive.
Reevaluating future dangerousness as proposed above would help
avoid prediction errors and would promote fairer capital sentencing
decisions. It should be coupled with carefully crafted rules on what
evidence and testimony may be admitted to demonstrate future
dangerousness, and clarification of any statutory terms that could
263
engender confusion or methodological inconsistency across cases.
B. Reforming Capital Sentencing Procedures
Thus far, the Article has demonstrated three core points: first, that
the incapacitation rationale has become a primary reason for death
sentences on the ground and, for that reason and others, deserves to
be taken seriously; second, that scholars and judicial critics have
relied on two mistaken objections to reject the incapacitation
rationale and give it little further thought; and third, that the first
objection (prediction error) can be addressed by reevaluating
dangerousness over time and the second objection (non-lethal
alternatives) deserves far more circumspect analysis in light of the
trade-offs involved. This last Section of the Article discusses related
flaws in the way that the incapacitation rationale is currently pursued
263 Legislatures are in the best position to clarify terms such as "probability" and "society"
in existing future dangerousness provisions, see infra note 295 and accompanying text, and
they have a moral duty to make the scope of these provisions clear, even if courts do not
force them to clarify the law on pain of its invalidation.
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in capital punishment sentencing, and proposes reforms to correct
these deficiencies.
Perhaps the most significant flaw is that current sentencing
procedures create a risk that the death penalty will be imposed
without a jury decision that it is deserved. All capital punishment
jurisdictions that permit juries to consider future dangerousneSS264
currently ask juries to consider future dangerousness at the same time
as desert. That procedure creates a dangerous possibility that if the
offender presents a future threat, the jury will choose to impose a
sentence of death solely upon that consideration. One scholar has
written that "when dangerousness is considered alongside other
aggravation there will always be a risk that it will replace culpability-
based aggravation in the ultimate sentencing decision by shifting a
juror's focus entirely to a fear of responsibility for future
violence."265 This concern has led some critics to conclude that future
dangerousness hould be banished altogether.26 6
Entirely eliminating future dangerousness from capital sentencing
is not necessary to ensure proper consideration of desert, however.
Instead, future dangerousness and desert can be considered separately
and sequentially. Indeed, there is no compelling reason why capital
sentencing proceedings must be structured in a way that requires or
invites the jury to consider both at the same time. There are two
possible ways in which sentencing procedures could separate the
inquiries. One would be to analyze future dangerousness first, prior to
the question of desert. However, if a jury decides that an offender
presents a future threat, it may not be able to ignore that finding when
considering desert. For this reason, a second option would be more
effective and fair: the jury should answer the moral question of desert
first, based on all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence, and
only if it decides that the death penalty is deserved should it proceed
to the question of future dangerousness. By requiring the jury to
consider desert before danger, states can guard against executions
that are not deserved.
264 See supra notes 43, 62, 71, 79-80.
265 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 17, at 168.
266 See, e.g., Dorland & Krauss, supra note 6, at 103-04 (arguing that states should
remove the explicit focus on future dangerousness from death sentencing, because it
"potentially removes the jury's attention from the issues of mitigation and 'deservedness').
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One may not be able to eliminate entirely the influence of future
risk from the consideration of desert, unfortunately. Research
suggests that most jurors take into account an offender's risk of
future violence in making a capital sentencing decision, regardless of
whether prosecutors put future dangerousness explicitly at issue.267
To mitigate this tendency, judges should instruct juries not to
consider future dangerousness during the culpability inquiry (unless a
defendant himself invites the inquiry by arguing that he is not a
future danger). They should advise juries that during the assessment
of aggravating and mitigating evidence, the sole task is to determine
whether the defendant deserves to die on grounds of his
culpability.268 Florida judges follow this approach already: they
instructjuries not to consider future dangerousness when considering
desert.2  Though they do so because Florida law prohibits
consideration of future dangerousness altogether, the same
instructions would be beneficial in jurisdictions seeking only to
separate the two inquiries.
Those who advocate capital punishment on the theory that executions
serve as a general deterrent to capital crimes may resist the separation of
desert and future dangerousness, because the reforms are likely to
reduce the number of death sentences. The reforms would reduce death
sentences by avoiding those death sentences that currently are being
imposed based on the jury's fear of future violence alone. By proposing
procedural reforms to ensure an independent decision that the death
penalty is deserved, fewer offenders will end up eligible for death.
Those who do not like this narrowing must ask whether they are willing
to execute persons who do not deserve to die, simply to deter others.
267 John H. Blume, Stephen P. Garvey, & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Future Dangerousness in
Capital Cases: Always "At Issue," 86 Cornell L. Rev. 397, 398-99 (2001). Based on their
research, Blume and his co-authors argue that juries should always be advised if a defendant
will be ineligible for parole, id., not merely when the state puts future dangerousness "at
issue." See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994) (plurality opinion)
(holding that due process requires the sentencing jury be informed a defendant is parole
ineligible when defendant's future dangerousness is at issue).
A well-crafted instruction would remove any misplaced sense of legal responsibility
on the part of the jury to consider future dangerousness and would bring home to the jury its
responsibility for reaching a decision based on desert. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S.
320, 323 (1985) (barring the state from advising the jury that the appellate court would make
the ultimate sentencing decision).
269 See, e.g., Allen v. State, 137 So. 3d 946, 961 (Fla. 2013).
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Few would openly embrace that position, and it is hard to imagine the
Supreme Court would allow states to advance it.
Procedurally separating the desert and dangerousness inquiries will
improve the fairness of capital sentencing. The law also must clearly
state the implications of the separate findings as to capital desert and
future dangerousness. A finding that the defendant deserves to die
should be a basic predicate for any death sentence. A future
dangerousness finding could be dealt with in at least two defensible
ways. One approach would be to make future dangerousness, like desert,
a precondition for execution. Texas and Oregon currently take this
approach. This option would ensure that two rationales for execution-
retribution and incapacitation-support any death sentence, thus
reducing "the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.,270
Jurisdictions might adopt this approach on the theory that human life
should be taken only when necessary to protect other human lives.271
An alternative approach would allow a future dangerousness finding
to serve as one possible reason for execution, but not the only one. This
second approach would allow for the execution of truly horrible
murderers (such as Hitler), regardless of whether they pose a future
danger in prison. To accomplish this result, a capital punishment
jurisdiction could authorize executions based on a threshold finding of
desert, plus either a finding of future dangerousness or a finding of
special culpability. Virginia has adopted an approach that is quite similar
to this. The Virginia death penalty statute allows the death penalty to be
considered only for specified types of aggravated first degree murder,
270 Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988).
271 For example, until very recently the Catechism of the Catholic Church stated:
"Assuming that the guilty party's identity and responsibility have been fully determined, the
traditional teaching of the Church does not exclude recourse to the death penalty, if this is
the only possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor."
Catechism of the Catholic Church § 2267 (2d ed.) (1995). In August 2018, Pope Francis
announced that the Catechism would be revised to hold the death penalty "inadmissible" in
all cases, emphasizing that alternative "systems of detention have been developed, which
ensure the due protection of citizens but, at the same time, do not definitively deprive the
guilty of the possibility of redemption." Hannah Brockhaus, Vatican Changes Catechism
Teaching on Death Penalty, Calls It 'Inadmissible,' Catholic News Agency (Aug. 2, 2018),
https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/vatican-changes-catechism-teaching-on-death-
penalty-calls-it-inadmissible-28541 [https://perma.cc/KQ3B-TYLL]. Whereas the former
Catechism anticipated that situations where execution would be necessary to stop an
offender from killing in the future would be "very rare, if not practically non-existent,"
Catechism of the Catholic Church § 2267 (2d ed.) (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted),
the new Catechism appears to rest on the factual assumption that such situations never arise.
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which are then defined as "capital murder."272 The statute then requires,
for any sentence of death, that the state additionally prove that the
offender either presents a future danger or has committed a particularly
vile offense.273 Virginia's law still suffers from a key flaw in that it
allows simultaneous consideration of desert and future dangerousness,
but that flaw can be removed by the reforms described above.274
Some critics still may insist that future dangerousness should be
eliminated from capital sentencing. While some may hold this view due
to problems such as prediction error, others may reach this conclusion
based on ideas of retributive justice. These critics might worry that a
focus on future dangerousness will displace the primacy of retributive
justice in punishment and replace it with "a regime single-mindedly
concerned with the prediction of crime and the incapacitation of
criminals."275 A capital sentencing regime that takes future
dangerousness into account need not ignore desert, however. Indeed, the
reforms outlined above would ensure that both are considered, and that
desert remains the fundamental question. If the law chooses to spare the
lives of some capital murderers, because they no longer threaten others,
that choice can be made without denying their culpability. By separating
the desert and dangerousness inquiries and first determining desert,
272 Va. Code Ann. §18.2-31 (2014) (defining capital murder).
273 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4 (2015) (requiring the future dangerousness or the finding
of a vile offense).
274 In Virginia, judges arguably could require the separate inquiries under existing law.
Virginia authorizes the death penalty for specified categories of aggravated murder. Va.
Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (2014). In the capital penalty phase, Virginia law requires the jury to
consider "evidence . . . which the court deems relevant to sentence," and states that this
evidence "may include the circumstances surrounding the offense, the history and
background of the defendant, and any other facts in mitigation of the offense." Va. Code
Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B). The law separately states that the death penalty "shall not be imposed
unless the Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt" that the defendant either
presents a future danger or that his capital crime was particularly "vile, horrible, or
inhuman." Id. § 19.2-264.4(C). A judge could require the jury to decide the future
dangerousness question only after considering whether the offender deserves the death
penalty, as a predicate matter, in light of the aggravating circumstances of the crime and any
mitigating evidence. But even in Virginia, it would be better to sequence the procedure in
that manner by legislative command, to ensure that such a narrowed penalty reflects
leislative intent and possesses democratic legitimacy.
0s O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the "Complexity" of Capital Punishment, 82
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1265, 1329 (2007); see also Edward Feser & Joseph M. Bessette, By Man
Shall His Blood Be Shed: A Catholic Defense of Capital Punishment 47 (2017) (objecting
that "modem secular thinkers" tend to deny "goodness and badness themselves as objective
features of the world").
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states can make clear which capital defendants deserve death but
nonetheless receive mercy.
Some critics might still be unsatisfied with the proposed reforms.
They might object that the death penalty should be strictly limited to the
very "worst of the worst," rather than those who either commit very
depraved crimes, or who are enduringly dangerous. While in theory this
approach may make sense-and indeed the Supreme Court has itself
embraced it-implementing this idea would be extremely difficult. It is
nearly impossible to rank the depravity of capital offenses because of the
incommensurate nature of the harms and immorality they reflect. Can
one assert, definitively, who is most culpable among murderers? The
one who has tortured and killed a young child, or another who has
bombed a church, or another who has murdered his victim out of racial
hatred? Which is worse depends entirely on personal moral judgments
made by individual jurors (as well as prosecutors and judges). If a juror
has a child of his own he may find the killing of a child incomparably
cruel. Indeed, some may find even non-lethal crimes against children to
be worse than certain types of murder. Justice Alito has expressed "little
doubt that, in the eyes of ordinary Americans, the very worst child
rapists . . . are the epitome of moral depravity.276 Others, equally
focused on moral depravity, might disagree.
A recent capital case highlighted the futility of trying to ascertain the
truly "worst" offenders. In Glossip v. Gross, the Court rejected a
challenge to a lethal injection protocol. In a dissent, Justice Breyer
called into question the constitutionality of the death penalty itself on the
ground that the worst offenders were not necessarily the ones who were
executed. He condemned the states' failure "to make the application of
the death penalty less arbitrary by restricting its use to . . . 'the worst of
the worst."',2 77 "Despite the Gregg Court's hope for fair administration
of the death penalty," he concluded, "40 years of further experience
make it increasingly clear that the death penalty is imposed arbitrarily,
i.e., without the 'reasonable consistency' legally necessary to reconcile
its use with the Constitution's commands."278
To prove his point about the arbitrariness of the death penalty, Justice
Breyer discussed the results of an empirical study of capital cases in
276 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 467 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting).
277 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2760 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
278 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Connecticut that suggested that the death penalty was not being imposed
on the worst offenders.279 The researchers began with a pool of 205
cases in which the offenders could have been charged with capital
crimes, and showed that only nine were ultimately sentenced to death;
the other 196 offenders avoided the death penalty through plea bargains,
acquittals, or lesser sentences.280 Of those nine, the researchers
concluded that only one "was indeed the 'worst of the worst' and, even
so, "no worse than" many of the offenders for whom the prosecutor did
not seek execution.281
Justice Thomas wrote separately to rebut Justice Breyer's argument.
He rejected Justice Breyer's claim that the death penalty was being
imposed arbitrarily because it.was not being narrowed to the worst of the
worst: "In my decades on the Court, I have not seen a capital crime that
could not be considered sufficiently 'blameworthy' to merit a death
sentence."2 82 For Justice Thomas, the death penalty did not have to be
limited to the worst of the worst; it was enough to limit the penalty to
those who are bad enough. Justice Thomas went on to castigate Justice
Breyer for relying on "pseudoscientific"283 studies to prove his points.
He noted that the Connecticut study had used law students to assess the
"egregiousness" of capital murders based only on case summaries,284
without an "opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, to see the
remorse of the defendant, [or] to feel the impact of the crime on the
victim's family." 285 These law students, Justice Thomas added, did not
bear "the burden of deciding the fate of another human being" and did
not represent "the community whose sense of security and justice may
279 Id. (citing John J. Donohue III, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death
Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic
Disparities?, 11 J. Emp. Legal Stud. 637, 678-79 (2014)).
2 0 Of the 205 cases that could have been charged as capital crimes, prosecutors charged a
capital felony in only 141 cases (69% of the 205 cases) and allowed forty-nine of those
charged with a capital felony to plead guilty to a non-capital offense. Donohue, supra note
279, at 641-43. Of the ninety-two defendants still facing capital charges (45% of the 205),
sixty-six were convicted of a capital offense (32% of the 205). Id. Twenty-eight faced a
death penalty sentencing hearing (14% of the 205), and twelve received the death penalty
(6% of the 205). Id. Three death sentences were overturned on appeal, leaving nine prisoners
sentenced to death (4% of the 205). Id.
281 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2760 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Donohue, supra note 279, at
678-69).
282 Id. at 2752 (Thomas, J., concurring).
283 Id.




have been torn asunder by an act of callous disregard for human life."28 6
Justice Thomas showed that the ranking of the egregiousness of capital
crimes reflected no more than the subjective moral judgments of the
study's authors. These judgments included the questionable claims that
it was more depraved to kill a prison guard than to kill a police officer,
for example, and more depraved to kill to make a political statement
than to kill out of racial hatred.287 Justice Thomas concluded that any
effort to rank the depravity of capital crimes is "arbitrary, not to mention
dehumanizing."2 88
Indeed, it is not possible to definitively rank such moral
egregiousness. There is no demonstrably right approach to those
intrinsically moral judgments. This makes aggravating factors such as
the "egregiousness" or "heinousness" of a murder-a common
aggravating factor in capital punishment statutes today-a poor mode of
narrowing jury discretion to avoid disparities and arbitrariness. And it
dooms to failure any effort to eliminate discrepancies in capital
sentencing by reserving the death penalty for the "worst of the worst."
The Constitution does not require the death penalty to be distributed
only on desert-based grounds, moreover. The Court has held that "[o]nce
the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined
category of persons eligible for the death penalty . .. the jury then is free
to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the
appropriate punishment."289 Thus, a state may narrow death-eligibility
based on the risk of future harm as well as desert. As the California
Supreme Court has explained, "[a] special circumstance [supporting the
death penalty] is not unconstitutional merely because it does not apply to
every defendant who may be otherwise deserving of the death
penalty."29
0
This reading of the Constitution is not without controversy, however,
and the debate warrants a closer look. While on the Court, Justice Souter
argued that "within the category of capital crimes, the death penalty
must be reserved for 'the worst of the worst."' 291 Justice Breyer likewise
286 Id.
287 Id. at 2752.
288 Id.
289 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 (1983).
290 People v. Ledesma, 140 P.3d 657, 719 (Cal. 2006) (rejecting a challenge under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution to an aggravating factor in
the California capital sentencing scheme).
291 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
1190 [Vol. 104:1123
The Death Penalty As Incapacitation
contended that "the application of the death penalty" must be limited "to
those whom Justice Souter called 'the worst of the worst."'
292 These
Justices have cited the Court's statement in Roper v. Simmons and Atkins
v. Virginia that "[c]apital punishment must be limited to those offenders
who commit 'a narrow category of the most serious crimes' and whose
extreme culpability makes them 'the most deserving 
of execution."'2 93
But that statement can be read to mean simply that capital murder must
be defined more narrowly than first-degree murder, so that only certain
aggravated types of murders are eligible for execution. In fact, that is
what other Supreme Court decisions, such as Jurek, already made clear:
a death penalty statute that narrows the range of crimes eligible for death
based on "aggravating circumstances" and allows the jury to consider
"mitigating circumstances" before determining that death is appropriate
sufficiently narrows the death penalty decision.
294 The Constitution does
not mandate that any further narrowing be based on culpability. Any
other reading would conflict with the Jurek Court's decision upholding
the constitutionality of Texas's sentencing scheme, which allowed the
death penalty only for particularly aggravated forms of murder and then
further limited the penalty to those offenders who presented a future
danger. Not only is this the better reading of the Court's precedents, but
it is the only reading that imposes on the states a task that they can
actually accomplish.
Thus, future dangerousness may be considered as a further
distribution criterion, once the jury decides that the death penalty is
deserved. States can then take several measures to foster consistency
across cases, such as to more clearly define future dangerousness for
death penalty purposes. State statutes currently define it as a
"probability" that the defendant would "commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society."
295 They
should also explain what a "probability" of future violence means. They
might even decide to require a higher standard, perhaps "virtual
292 Glossip,135 S. Ct. at 2760 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Marsh, 548 U.S. at 206 (Souter, J., dissenting)).
293 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 319 (2002)).
294 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 273-74 (1976)
295 See supra notes 43, 63-65, 71-73 and accompanying text (citing statutes).
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certainty," as suggested by one scholar.296 In a similar vein, states should
clarify whether a threat to "society" encompasses a risk to fellow
inmates and prison guards, or only to persons outside of prison walls.
This Article has contended that the lives of all persons, inside and
outside of prison, should be taken into account. There is no one right
answer to these questions; any decision necessarily turns on how much
risk a community is willing to tolerate and how willing it is to take a
human life to protect itself. The key is that any decision should reflect
reasoned public and legislative debate, and should not result simply
from decades of legislative inertia.
Meaningful reforms will require honest and open legislative and
public debate regarding the incapacitation rationale and the way that it is
currently pursued in capital sentencing procedures. If academic and
judicial commentators wish to promote such reforms and help them bear
fruit, they too must begin to take seriously the incapacitation
rationale.297
CONCLUSION
This Article has challenged the dominant view among scholars and
judges that the incapacitation rationale for the death penalty is irrelevant
and indefensible, and has exposed some of the costs of ignoring its
importance. The incapacitation theory implicates profound and complex
moral questions, which must be answered if we are to reduce
arbitrariness and injustice in the practice of capital punishment today.
The arguments and reforms outlined in this Article are designed to
illuminate a path forward.
Capital punishment opponents, however, may be unsatisfied with any
reforms that fall short of total abolition. Some may even fear that
reforms designed to improve the fairness of capital punishment will
make the death penalty less likely to be abolished.298 In fact, prominent
scholars and abolition advocates have expressed this view. But resisting
reforms that would make the death penalty more fair and defensible
296 Slobogin, supra note 216, at 53; see also id. at 4 (arguing that preventative detention
should reflect a "proportionality principle," requiring that "the degree of danger be roughly
proportionate to the proposed government intervention").
297 Deference should not be granted to the initial finding of fact if additional evidence
comes to light that changes the equation.
298 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support Legislative
"Reform" of the Death Penalty?, 63 Ohio St. L.J. 417, 418 (2002).
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would make us complicit in unjust capital sentences caused by the lack
of reform. A reasonable abolitionist might conclude that no life-
promoting end goal justifies sacrificing the lives of human beings now
before our eyes. That is particularly true when the end goal is far from
assured. As abolitionists Professors James Liebman and Lawrence
Marshall have observed, "even those who believe that 'none is best' can
recognize that 'less is better"'299-or at least they should.
In the end, one's view of the proper role of future dangerousness in
capital punishment depends on normative judgments about the value of
future security, human life, human dignity, procedural fairness,
accuracy, and consistency. A reasoned perspective may also require
additional empirical evidence regarding the risk of error, the possibility
of reform, and the existence of more humane forms of confinement.
Reasonable people may in good faith choose different approaches, in
light of these moral and empirical considerations. Some may conclude
that neither execution nor solitary confinement should be permitted, as
this author would. Others may conclude that future dangerousness
should continue to play a role in capital punishment, but may favor one
or more of the reforms the Article suggests to make its use more
consistent and defensible. None of these conclusions can be reached in a
thoughtful and reasoned way without honest and informed analysis
about the risk of future danger and the options for addressing it. It is past
time that scholars and courts take seriously the moral and legal
dimensions of the incapacitation rationale.







Date Date Delay (Years)
Gary Gilmore UT 10/7/1976 1/17/1977 0.28
John Arthur FL 12/20/1973 5/25/1979 5.43Spenkelink
Jesse Walter NV 2/10/1978 10/22/1979 1.70Bishop
Steven IN 2/25/1980 3/9/1981 1.03Timothy Judy
FrankJ. VA 9/26/1978 8/11/1982 3.88Coppola
Charles
Brs J. TX 12/3/1977 12/7/1982 5.01Brooks Jr.
John Louis AL 4/27/1977 4/22/1983 5.99Evans
Robert A. FL 11/12/1973 11/30/1983 10.05Sullivan
John Eldon GA 1/30/1975 12/15/1983 8.87Smith
Robert Wayne LA 4/20/1979 12/14/1983 4.65Williams
300 Sources on file with author.
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Execution Delay in 2016301
Sentence Execution Execution
Name State Date Date Delay (Years)
Oscar Bolin FL 10/30/1992 1/7/2016 23.19
Richard TX 5/15/2002 1/20/2016 13.68
Masterson
Christopher AL 11/10/1993 1/21/2016 22.20
Brooks
James TX 11/10/2008 1/27/2016 7.21
Freeman
Brandon GA 10/11/1979 2/3/2016 36.31
Jones
Gustavo TX 1/8/1992 2/16/2016 24.11
Garcia
Travis (A 3/17/1993 2/17/2016 22.92
Hittson
Coy TX 9/2/1998 3/9/2016 17.52
Wesbrook
301 Sources on file with author.
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Adam Ward TX 6/27/2007 3/22/2016 8.73
Joshua
Bishop GA 2/13/1996 3/31/2016 20.13Bishop
Pablo TX 3/30/1999 4/6/2016 17.02Vasquez
Kenneth GA 5/22/1997 4/12/2016 18.89Fults
Daniel GA 9/17/1999 4/27/2016 16.61Lucas
Earl Forrest MO 12/17/2004 5/11/2016 11.40
John Conner GA 7/14/1982 7/15/2016 34.00
Barney TX 7/21/2004 10/5/2016 12.21Fuller
Gregory GA 3/3/2000 10/19/2016 16.63Lawler
Steven
Spes GA 3/22/2007 11/16/2016 9.65
Spears
William GA 3/30/1991 12/6/2016 25.68Sallie
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Appendix III:
Execution Delay in 201702
Name State Sentence Execution Execution
Date Date Delay (Years)
Christopher TX 3/12/2008 1/11/2017 8.83
Wilkins
Ricky Gray VA 10/23/2006 1/18/2017 10.24
Terry TX 11/21/2003 1/26/2017 13.18
Edwards
Mark MO 10/8/1999 1/31/2017 17.32
Christeson
Rolando TX 1/20/1995 3/7/2017 22.13
Ruiz
James Bigby TX 3/25/1991 3/14/2017 25.97
Ledell Lee AR 10/16/1995 4/20/2017 21.51
Jack Jones AR 4/17/1996 4/24/2017 21.02
Marcel AR 1/14/1997 4/24/2017 20.28
Williams
Kenneth AR 8/30/2000 4/27/2017 16.66
Williams
J.W. GA 11/14/1992 5/17/2017 24.51
Ledford
302 Sources on file with the author.
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Thomas AL 2/19/1983 5/26/2017 34.27
Arthur
Robert
Moen AL 5/16/1996 6/8/2017 21.07
Melson
William VA 8/25/2008 7/6/2017 8.87
Morva
Ronald
Philp OH 10/5/1993 7/26/2017 23.81Phillips
TaiChin TX 3/14/2005 7/27/2017 12.37
Preyor
Mark Asay FL 11/18/1988 8/24/2017 28.77
Gary Otte OH 10/6/1992 9/13/2017 24.94
Michael FL 3/22/1984 10/5/2017 33.54
Lambrix
Robert TX 4/30/2002 10/12/2017 15.45
Pruett
Torrey
Morrbb AL 2/19/1999 10/19/2017 18.67McNabb
Hatricn FL 8/5/1991 11/8/2017 26.26Hannon
Rbena TX 2/20/1998 11/8/2017 19.72Cardenas
Average
Delay 20.41
Across 23
Executions
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